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THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 










 The challenge of protecting the biosphere has both salient academic 
and policy dimensions.  On the academic side, persistent efforts have been 
made in the field of socio-legal studies to enhance the understanding of the 
complex processes involved, in the domestic arena and on the international 
front, in the formation and transformation of the elaborate institutional 
arrangements designed to contribute to this goal.  The scholars engaged in 
those efforts have pursued divergent paths, but one school of thought has 
moved decisively to the forefront.  China’s experience does not cast doubt 
on its relevance, or even prominence, yet it suggests that multi-pronged 
research strategies may prove more effective. 
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I.  Introduction  
 The notion of governance has long loomed large on the legal and 
social science research agendas.  In 1975, it metamorphosed into a broader 
analytical construct, when the idea of a regime was floated.
1
  The latter was 
defined by a researcher in the field of international relations as a "set of 
mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies, 
and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a [relevant] 
group of [participants in the political process]."
2
  The concept of a 
governance regime has subsequently gained currency.
3
  For the past three 
decades or so, it has generally been viewed as a useful vehicle for 
conveying the existence of elaborate institutional mechanisms whose 
purpose is to consistently influence the actions of players in the political 
arena, both domestic and international.
4
 
 The initial definition merely served as a starting point in a quest to 
render it meaningful and workable.  As theory-building efforts and 
empirical testing expanded in scope and assumed a more diverse form, it 
became apparent that a slightly wider and a somewhat less elastic formula 
would be needed.  A definition better meeting the growing requirements of 
the large number of scholars from divergent disciplinary backgrounds who 
opted to focus on the subject emerged at an academic conference devoted to 
systematically exploring the fundamental attributes of governance regimes.
5
  
A consensus crystallized that they constitute: 
 
[S]ets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and 
decision making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given [political domain]. 
Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude.  
Norms are standards of behavior.  Rules are specific 
prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making 




                                                 
 1. See John G. Ruggie, International Responses to Technology:  Concepts and 
Trends, 29 INT’L ORG. 557, 570–73 (1975) (discussing the concept, purposes, and functions 
of international regimes). 
 2.  Id. at 570. 
 3.  See infra note 21 (exemplifying the growing literature on governance regimes). 
 4.  See infra note 21 (providing examples of both domestic and international 
governance regimes). 
 5.  See Krasner, infra note 6, at 2–5 (exploring the different perspectives of 
contributory authors regarding definition of regime and regime change).  See also Young & 
Osherenko, infra note 60, at 1 (providing discussion about the relevant academic 
conference). 
 6.  Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences:  Regimes as 
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983). 




 The new formulation consists of four key components:  "principles, 
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures."
7
  The differences are subtle 
and may be easier to grapple with at the theoretical level than in practical 
settings.  The overall hierarchical structure however seems to be viable, 
involving an orderly stepwise progression from the general/strategic to the 
specific/operational elements. While a certain degree of ambiguity and 
incompleteness persists, this definition continues to feature prominently in 
the literature on governance regimes and firmly underpins much of the 
varied research pursued in this area.
8
 
 Such research displays a pronounced normative orientation.  The 
principal goal is to identify regime characteristics that may improve well-
being in the domestic and international arenas, transform them into 
effective institutional instruments and ensure that the prescriptive edifice is 
adhered to. Some of the studies undertaken in this field however are 
primarily geared toward enhancing the understanding of regime anatomy 
(description) and physiology (explanation).
9
  A recent empirical project that 
falls into this category is an examination of the relationship between 
governance regimes, corruption, and economic growth.
10
 
 The definition of a governance regime adopted by economists/political 
scientists has been applied across the policy spectrum, including in the 
environmental domain.
11
  Given the practical orientation displayed by 
scholars concerned with ecological issues, they have however tended to 
decompose this formula, bring into focus its individual components, and 
                                                 
 7.  Id.  See also Young & Osherenko, infra note 63, at 1 (discussing the key 
components of governance regimes). 
 8.  See William H. Meyer & Boyka Stefanova, Human Rights, the UN Global 
Compact, and Global Governance, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 501, 514 (2001) (recognizing the 
most common definition of regime as "[p]rinciples, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area").  See generally 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Book Review, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 454 (1995) (reviewing REGIME 
THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Volker Rittberger et al. eds.,1993)) (examining 
literature on regime theory and international relations). 
 9.  See infra Part II (discussing regime anatomy and physiology). 
 10.  See Toke Aidt, Jayasri Dutta, & Vania Sena, Governance Regimes, Corruption, 
and Growth:  Theory and Evidence, 36 J. COMP. ECON. 195, 195 (2008) (assessing "the role 
of political accountability as a determinant of corruption and economic growth."). 
 11.  See Oran R. Young & Marc A. Levy, The Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Regimes, in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGIMES:  CAUSAL CONNECTIONS AND BEHAVIORAL MECHANISMS 1, 1 (Oran R. Young ed., 
1999) (" [R]egimes are ‘social institutions consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, 
procedures, and programs that govern the interactions of actors in specific . . . areas.’" 
(quoting Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young & Michael Zürn, The Study of International 
Regimes, 1 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 267, 274 (1995))). 
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 The former are regarded as "broad, framework arrangements 
governing the activities of all (or almost all) the members of [domestic or] 
international society over a wide range of specific issues."
13
  By contrast, 
the latter are viewed as "more specialized arrangements that pertain to well-
defined activities, resources, or geographical areas and often involve only 
some subset of the members of [domestic or] international society."
14
  
Again, in light of their practical disposition, environmental researchers have 




 The notion of an environmental governance regime, as outlined here, 
has been subject to extensive theoretical and empirical exploration.
16
  
Substantial descriptive, explanatory, and prescriptive insights have been 
generated by researchers studying the subject.
17
  Chinese attitudes and 
behavior however have been accorded scant attention, despite the size of 
the country, its growing economic and political prominence, the massive 
ecological degradation it has witnessed, and the inadequate measures it has 
embraced to cope with the problem.
18
  The purpose of this paper is to 
selectively shrink the gap by using certain China-specific experiences as a 
platform for offering some analytical observations about the development 





                                                 
 12.  See ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION:  BUILDING REGIMES FOR 
NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 13 (1989) [hereinafter YOUNG, 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION] ("[S]tudents of international affairs . . . divide the category 
of international institutions into two more or less distinct subsets:  international orders and 
international regimes."). 
 13.  Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 12, at 13 ("[S]tudents of 
international affairs . . . divide the category of international institutions into two more or less 
distinct subsets:  international orders and international regimes."); Young & Levy, supra 
note 11, at 1 (quoting Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young & Michael Zürn, The Study of 
International Regimes, 1 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 267, 274 (1995)) ("[R]egimes are ‘social 
institutions consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, procedures, and programs that 
govern the interactions of actors in specific . . . areas.’") [Again, see my 
comment/explanation at Note 11.] 
 16.  Infra Part II. 
 17.  Infra Part II. 
 18.  Infra Part III. 
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II. Conceptual Foundations 
A. Competing Paradigms 
 The prolonged search for a satisfactory definition may be attributed to 
intellectual birth pangs rather than merely a combination of the inherent 
complexity of the underlying phenomenon and methodological 
thoroughness.
19
  The initial phases of the evolution of the academic work 
devoted to regimes, including those ecologically-centered, were 
characterized by a degree of doubt, tension, and uncertainty. These features 
persist, but on a much more modest scale, and the studies currently 
undertaken are marked by a considerable measure of continuity, 
connectivity, and overall direction. They may be considered as part of a 
coherent, integrated, and ongoing scholarly enterprise.
20
 
 In the environmental domain, this enterprise is systematically geared 
toward shedding light on regime attributes, regime types/variations, regime 
formation, regime change, and regime effectiveness/consequences.
21
  The 
attention accorded to each individual dimension has shifted over time.
22
  As 
theoretical knowledge has accumulated and a meaningful body of empirical 
                                                 
 19.  YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 12, at 12. 
 20.  See infra note 21 (providing examples of current scholarly research related to 
governance regimes). 
 21.  See generally GLOBAL GOVERNANCE:  DRAWING INSIGHTS FROM THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL EXPERIENCE (Oran R. Young ed., 1997) (further assessing international 
regime governance); INSTITUTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE:  PRINCIPAL FINDINGS, 
APPLICATIONS, AND RESEARCH FRONTIERS (Oran R. Young, Leslie A. King & Heike 
Schroeder eds., 2008) (evaluating the relationship between institutions and regimes); 
REGIME CONSEQUENCES:  METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES AND RESEARCH STRATEGIES (Arild 
Underdal & Oran R. Young eds., 2004) (assessing regime effectiveness); ORAN R. YOUNG, 
CREATING REGIMES:  ARCTIC ACCORDS AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE (1988) 
[hereinafter YOUNG, CREATING REGIMES] (providing examples of international regime 
creation); ORAN R. YOUNG, THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE:  
FIT, INTERPLAY, AND SCALE (2002) (discussing the role of institutions with regard to 
environmental change); YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 12 (providing an 
overarching analysis of regime building); ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE:  
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY (1994) [hereinafter YOUNG, 
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE] (analyzing international regime governance); ORAN R. 
YOUNG, RESOURCE REGIMES:  NATURAL RESOURCES AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1982) 
[hereinafter YOUNG, RESOURCE REGIMES] (assessing resource regimes in an environmental 
context); POLAR POLITICS:  CREATING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES (Oran R. 
Young & Gail Osherenko eds., 1993) (providing an overview of international regime 
creation); JORGEN WETTESTAD, DESIGNING EFFECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES:  THE KEY 
CONDITIONS (1999) (discussing the elements essential to environmental regime creation);  
ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME EFFECTIVENESS (Edward L. Miles et al. eds., 2002) (considering 
the elements necessary for effective environmental regimes); Young & Levy, supra note 11 
(discussing the effectiveness of international regimes in an environmental context).  
 22.  See supra note 21 and accompanying text (providing a breadth of literature on 
regime formation, identification, and effectiveness). 
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findings has emerged, researchers have naturally started placing less 
emphasis on description (attributes and types/variations) than explanation 
(formation and change) and evaluation (effectiveness/consequences).
23
  The 
rapid deterioration in ecological conditions, coupled with the perception 
that policy responses are inadequate, has lately turned the issue of 
effectiveness/consequences into the principal intellectual concern.
24
 
 Because of its intricate nature, this is a more resource-intensive issue 
than the others, which has compounded the crowding-out problem.
25
  That 
said, the interest in regimes attributes, types/variations, formation and 
change has merely diminished rather than disappeared altogether.
26
  These 
facets of environmental regime structure and dynamics, particularly the last 
two, continue to loom on the scholarly agenda.
27
  There is no reason to 
assume that this pattern is likely to reverse itself as many relevant questions 
pertaining to description and explanation remain unanswered.
28
  The focus 
in the present paper on regime development (formation and change, but 
primarily the former) is thus by no means misplaced. 
 It should be noted at the outset that some regimes, in the ecological 
domain and elsewhere, are self-generating or spontaneous entities.
29
  Like 
in the unfettered marketplace, the expectations of the players involved 
converge, despite the absence of a conscious effort to this effect or 
occasionally even consciousness, and shape their behavior without recourse 
to formal coordination.
30
  This is an elusive phenomenon whose essence 
cannot be readily captured.
31
  A relatively successful attempt by a 
prominent libertarian economist has produced the following succinct 
observation:  "[some regimes are] the products of the action of many men 
but…not the result of human design."
32
 
 The processes giving rise to spontaneous governance systems have not 
been satisfactorily accounted for.
33
  Socio-biological explanations are 
                                                 
 23.  See supra note 21 and accompanying text (same). 
 24. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (same). 
 25.  See supra note 21 and accompanying text (same). 
 26.  See supra note 21 and accompanying text (same). 
 27.  See supra note 21 and accompanying text (same). 
 28.  See supra note 21 and accompanying text (same). 
 29.  See, e.g., 1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY:  RULES AND ORDER 
37 (1973) (discussing the distinction and differences between exogenous and endogenous 
orders). 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  See id. at 38 ("[S]uch orders . . . do not obtrude themselves on our senses but have 
to be traced to our intellect.  We cannot see, or otherwise intuitively perceive, this order of 
meaningful actions, but are only able mentally to reconstruct it by tracing the relations that 
exist between the elements."). 
 32.  Id. at 37.  See also ARILD VATN, INSTITUTIONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 169–191 
(2005) (discussing institutional establishment and change). 
 33.  See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 12, at 85 ("The processes 
through which spontaneous arrangements arise are not well-understood."). 
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regarded as excessively mechanical and those derived from social 
psychology as overly static.
34
  Game theorists have explored methodical 
coordination between interdependent actors in situations where explicit 
communication is not possible or does not take place.
35
  The ideas 
generated by them are not without theoretical appeal, although in 
themselves they fall significantly short of furnishing a comprehensive 
analytical framework, due to the parsimonious nature of the models 




 Negotiated governance regimes are easier to trace chronologically and 
outline conceptually.  Such comparatively transparent institutional 
arrangements are "characterized by conscious efforts to agree on their 
major provisions, explicit consent on the part of the individual participants, 
and formal expression of the results."
37
  A number of distinctions are 
commonly drawn in this context (e.g., between "constitutional contracts" 





  They are broadly relevant, but not essential for accounting for 
every conceivable aspect of regime development, and will thus not be 
pursued any further here. 
 Imposed regimes, such as those forced on China in the wake of the 
Opium Wars,
40
 stand in sharp contrast to self-generating or spontaneous 
ones in that they are deliberately conceived and asymmetrically 
structured.
41
  The source of the initiative is typically a dominant power or a 
                                                 
 34.  See id. at 85–86 ("The propositions of sociobiology are not sufficient to provide a 
satisfactory account of the formation of institutional arrangements that take such diverse 
forms and change so rapidly.  And social psychology offers no comprehensive theoretical 
account of interactive learning relevant to the emergence of social conventions.").   
 35.  See generally ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION:  AGENT-
BASED MODELS OF COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION (1997) (discussing various models of 
cooperation) ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (analyzing the 
theory of cooperation, with particular reference to the Prisoner’s Dilemma); THOMAS C. 
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1980) (providing a comprehensive analysis of 
conflict theories and strategies). 
 36.  See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 12, at 85–86 (discussing 
regime development). 
 37.  Id. at 86. 
 38.  See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 12, at 86–87 ("Such 
regimes may take the form either of constitutional contracts or legislative bargains . . . .  It is 
useful, as well, to distinguish between comprehensive negotiated regimes and those that can 
be described as partial or piecemeal."). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  See Alfred W. McCoy, From Free Trade to Prohibition:  A Critical History of the 
Modern Opium Trade, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 307, 310 (discussing the two different 
Western governance regimes forced on China in the wake of the narcotics trade).   
 41.  See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 12, at 88 ("Imposed 
arrangements differ from self-generating or spontaneous regimes in that they are fostered 
deliberately by dominant powers or consortia of dominant powers."). 
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group of players with superior resource capabilities.
42
  The means employed 
may consist of some combination of coercion, cooptation, and material 
manipulation.
43
  Since no consent of subordinate parties is sought and 
effective operation does not hinge on formal expression, this type of regime 
also differs fundamentally in both theory and practice from negotiated 
arrangements.
44
  Again, that is a subject that will not be examined in any 
detail in the present paper. 
 The choice not to delve into the workings of spontaneous and imposed 
regimes is not a reflection of their rare occurrence.  Quite the contrary, it 
should be acknowledged that the incidence/prevalence of such 
arrangements is far greater than suggested in the literature on the subject, 
which is heavily influenced by schools of thought that possibly overstate 
the role played by conscious design in institutional development and are ill-
disposed toward organic conceptions of society (as a spontaneously 
organized system) because of their apparent illiberal underpinnings.
45
  Both 
spontaneous and imposed regimes are common phenomena, particularly in 
international settings, but they are just not highly relevant as distinct entities 
in this specific context. 
 Environmental researchers portray regime development as a multi-
phase iterative cycle.
46
  Those who focus on the domestic arena typically 
identify for purposes of analysis six separate stages, each with its own 
unique characteristics, through which the players involved move in a 
loosely sequential fashion:  agenda setting, policy formulation, policy 
adoption, policy implementation, policy evaluation, and policy 
adjustment.
47
  The last step in the process (i.e. adjustment) may entail 




                                                 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  See id. at 88 ("In short, imposed regimes are established deliberately by dominant 
powers who succeed in getting others to conform to the requirements of these arrangements 
through some combination of coercion, cooptation, and the manipulation of incentives."). 
 44.  See id. ("[S]uch regimes typically do not involve explicit consent on the part of 
subordinate actors, and they often operate effectively in the absence of any formal 
expression"). 
 45.  Id. at 90–92. 
 46.  See generally MICHAEL HOWLETT, M. RAMESH, & ANTHONY PERL, STUDYING 
PUBLIC POLICY:  POLICY CYCLES AND POLICY SUBSYSTEMS (3rd ed. 2009) (elaborating on the 
six stages of the public policy cycle); MICHAEL E. KRAFT & SCOTT R. FURLONG, PUBLIC 
POLICY:  POLITICS, ANALYSIS, AND ALTERNATIVES  (2nd ed. 2006) (providing a broad 
overview of the field of public policy). 
 47.  See HOWLETT, supra note 46, at 91–211 (discussing the six public policy stages); 
KRAFT & FURLONG, supra note 46, at 71–84 (analyzing the six stages of public policy). 
 48.  See HOWLETT, supra note 46, at 197–211 (providing an overview of patterns of 
policy change); KRAFT & FURLONG, supra note 46, at 71–72, 84 (analyzing the six stages of 
public policy). 
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 The international arena is more decentralized than its domestic 
counterpart
49
 and this necessitates a somewhat different approach.  Fewer 
phases are commonly singled out and less emphasis is normally placed on 
semi-structured iteration within a clearly-defined cyclical framework.
50
  
The number of stages identified seldom exceeds three (e.g., pre-negotiation, 
negotiation, and post-negotiation; or, alternatively, agenda setting, 
negotiation, and operationalization)
51
 and the overall process has a linear 
quality to it, although it may be protracted in nature and may involve 
lengthy pauses, extended sideways drifting, and sharp retreats.
52
  The core 
phase "begins with the initiation of direct and focused negotiations and ends 
with the signing of an agreement."
53
  Additional interrelated activities 
precede and follow it: 
 
The pre[-]negotiation stage encompasses the process 
through which an issue initially finds its way onto the 
international agenda, gets defined or framed as a topic for 
international consideration, and reaches a sufficiently 
prominent place on the agenda to justify expending the 
time and effort involved in explicit negotiations. The post[-
]negotiation stage covers all those steps needed to 
transform an international agreement signed by the parties 
who have agreed on its terms into an actual institutional 
arrangement in place. Among other things, this entails 
ratification by the signatories and implementation within 







                                                 
 49.  See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 12–13 (analyzing 
international regime governance). 
 50.  See generally YOUNG, CREATING REGIMES, supra note 23, at 4–27 (providing 
examples of international regime creation); YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra 
note 23, at 82–84 (analyzing international regime governance); Ho-Won Jeong, Dynamics of 
Environmental Negotiations, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES:  INSTITUTIONS AND 
PROCEDURES 101, 102–105 (Ho-Won Jeong ed., 2001) (discussing environmental regimes in 
the context of negotiation). 
 51.  See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 83 ("[I]t is helpful to 
divide the overall sequence into at least three stages:  pre[-]negotiation, negotiation, and 
post[-]negotiation."). 
 52.  See YOUNG, CREATING REGIMES, supra note 23, at 4–27 (providing examples of 
international regime creation); YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 82–
84 (analyzing international regime governance). 
 53.  YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 83. 
 54.  Id. 
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Table 1:  Key Features of Principal Phases of Regime Development 
1. Driving forces:  Ideas are particularly prominent during 
agenda setting; interests dominate the stage of negotiation; 
material conditions become increasingly significant in the 
course of the shift from paper to practice. 
2. Players:  There are no discernible changes from one stage 
of regime development to another in the roles played by 
organizations. However, in the case of individuals, 
intellectual leadership is crucial during agenda setting, 
entrepreneurial leadership looms large in the course of 
negotiation, and structural leadership is vital throughout the 
entire process. 
3. Collective-action problems:  Gridlock is the classic 
collective-action problem of the negotiation stage; 
miscommunication is the standard pitfall of agenda setting; 
asymmetries in levels of effort are the typical hazard of 
operationalization. 
4. Context:  Broad shifts in the political environment affect 
agenda setting; more specific exogenous events impinge on 
negotiations; domestic constraints influence 
operationalization. 
5. Tactics:  The concern with threats and promises is most 
pronounced during negotiation; efforts to shape the framing 
of the problem manifest themselves in the course of agenda 
setting; administrative/bureaucratic maneuvers gain 
momentum during operationalization. 
6. Design perspectives:  Agenda setting is the time for 
considering the big picture; negotiation gives rise to a 
preoccupation with the language to be included in the 
agreements; operationalization heightens sensitivity to the 
domestic repercussions of policy action and dampens 
enthusiasm for international cooperation. 
Adapted from Young, Creating Regimes:  Arctic Accords and International Governance, 
supra note 7, at 21. 
 
The academic literature on the development of domestic governance 
regimes is characterized by a greater degree of coherence than that on their 
international counterparts.
55
  This may be attributed to structural differences 
                                                 
 55.  See generally DANIEL J. FIORINO, MAKING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1995) 
(assessing policy formation); SALWA S. GOMAA, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY MAKING IN EGYPT 
(1997) (providing an analysis of policy making with particular reference to policy making in 
Egypt); MICHAEL R. GREENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE (2008) 
(providing a general overview of policy making in an environmental context); JOHN B. 
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stemming from divergent authority patterns.
56
  As indicated, political power 
is centralized (albeit not uniformly) within States but not beyond their 
confines (again, there are variations in this respect).
57
  Given the broad 
regularities observed, environmental researchers have thus been content to 
undertake domestically-centered studies without stretching the established 
analytical boundaries,
58
 while pushing the conceptual envelope on the 
international front.
59
  For the same reasons, this paper has a similar bias, 
although an attempt is made to draw on China’s experience at home as well. 
 Scholars who explore the development of negotiated international 
environmental regimes embrace a number of competing theoretical 
perspectives.
60
  Those who derive their inspiration from microeconomics 
favor utilitarian explanations of the behavioral patterns observed in the 
global arena.
61
  The fundamental assumption is that these patterns are the 
                                                                                                                 
LOOMIS & GLORIA E. HELFAND, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ANALYSIS FOR DECISION MAKING 
(2001) (considering how policy and decision making intertwine); MIRANDA A. SCHREURS, 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN JAPAN, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED STATES (2002) (comparing 
Japanese, German, and American approaches to environmental policy making); ALBERT 
WEALE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE:  AN EVEN CLOSER ECOLOGICAL 
UNION (2000) (discussing regime governance in Europe); RUDIGER K.W. WURZEL, 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY-MAKING IN BRITAIN, GERMANY, AND THE EUROPEAN UNION:  THE 
EUROPEANIZATION OF AIR AND WATER POLLUTION CONTROL (2002) (providing examples of 
British and German policy making in the European Union).  
 56.  See supra note 55 (providing general background information of comparative 
policy making). 
 57.  See supra note 55 (same). 
 58.   See supra note 55 (same). 
 59.  See generally POLAR POLITICS:  CREATING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGIMES, supra note 23(providing an overview of international regime creation); YOUNG, 
CREATING REGIMES, supra note 23 (providing examples of international regime creation); 
YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23 (analyzing international regime 
governance). 
 60.  See generally GABRIELLA KUTTING, ENVIRONMENT, SOCIETY, AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS:  TOWARDS MORE EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 14–
15 (2000) (analyzing social organizations in an environmental context); KATE O’NEILL, THE 
ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 7–20 (2009) (discussing global 
environmental issues and how they may be addressed); YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 91–95 (analyzing international regime governance); Ho-
Won Jeong, Politics for Global Environmental Governance, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICIES:  INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES, supra note 52, at 3, 15–20 (providing insight on 
political issues with regards to international environmental governance regimes); Matthew 
Paterson, Theoretical Perspectives on International Environmental Politics, in PALGRAVE 
ADVANCES IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 54, 55–59 (Michele M. Betsill, 
Kathryn Hochstetler, & Dimitris Stevis eds., 2006) (providing a general overview of 
international political theory); Oran R. Young & Gail Osherenko, The Formation of 
International Regimes:  Hypotheses and Cases, in POLAR POLITICS:  CREATING 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES, supra note 23, at 1, 11–13 (providing 
international regime case studies). 
 61.  See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 91–95 (discussing 
the utilitarian model of regime formation). 
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product of actions taken by players motivated by a desire to maximize 
benefits and minimize costs (including transaction costs).
62
  The logic 
extends to inter-party cooperation, which has material consequences, some 
positive and some negative.
63
  When the joint gains potentially exceed the 




 Another school of thought, the realist variant, is grounded in 
traditional-style political science, which is primarily concerned with the 
exercise of power, or who gets what, when and how.
65
  Its worldview rests 
on an unambiguously pessimistic perception of human nature that is 
underpinned by Machiavellian/Hobbesian philosophy.
66
  States are believed 
to be principally driven by considerations of national interest/power.
67
  The 
relentless quest for power lies at the root of international conflict/war.
68
  
The emergence of powerful States/hegemons however may exert a 
stabilizing influence/bring about hegemonic stability, paving the way for 
regime formation (reflecting power asymmetries but not necessarily 
amounting to a forceful imposition by one party over another).
69
 
 Neorealist accounts diverge in some respects from this analytic 
configuration.
70
  The international system is thought to be far more 
decentralized and feature much less inequality among States.
71
  It is also 
regarded as considerably more fluid and significantly less resistant to 
                                                 
 62.  See id. (discussing the utilitarian model of regime formation). 
 63.  See id. (same). 
 64.  See id. (same). 
 65.  See generally KUTTING, supra note 63, at 12–13 (providing an overview of 
realism); HAROLD D. LASSWELL, POLITICS:  WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, AND HOW (1990) 
(providing a critical understanding of political actors’ methods and results); O’NEILL, supra 
note 63, at 7–29 (discussing various schools of thought related to international 
environmental politics); YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 87–91 
(assessing realism);  Young & Osherenko, The Formation of International Regimes:  
Hypotheses and Cases, supra note 63, at 9–11 (discussing power-based hypotheses).  
 66.  See KUTTING, supra note 63, at 12 ("It takes a pessimistic view of human nature 
grounded in Machiavellian and Hobbesian philosophy."). 
 67.  See id. ("Because of its emphasis on the political sphere, the realist perspective 
reduces analysis of the relationship between states to issues of power and self-interest, i.e. 
national interest."). 
 68.  See id. ("The drive to maximize power leads to war as states compete for power."). 
 69.   Id. at 12–14. 
 70.  See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 87–91 (discussing 
neorealism);  KUTTING, supra note 63, at 13 (providing an assessment of the neorealist 
philosophy);  O’NEILL, supra note 63, at 7–20 (discussing various school of thought related 
to international environmental politics). 
 71.  See KUTTING, supra note 63, at 13 ("[I]nternational systems are decentralized and 
anarchic."). 
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change because of frequent shifts in State capabilities.
72
  The implications 
for regime development however are relatively modest.
73
  Greater attention 
is accorded, typically in game-theoretic terms, to the provision of public 
goods in an inherently anarchic global setting, but inter-party 




 Cognitivist/psychological-style formulations constitute a genuine 
departure from the rationalist characterizations of behavior witnessed in the 
international arena.
75
  Inter-party cooperation/regime formation is not 
portrayed as the result of deliberate moves by unitary players methodically 
weighing the benefits and costs of alternative institutional arrangements in a 
synoptic fashion.
76
  Those involved in the process seldom possess a clearly-
defined and a highly-stable preference function/structure.
77
  Rather than 
calmly and consistently resorting to a sophisticated utility/power calculus, 
they are subject to a plethora of complex influences (e.g., belief systems, 
cultural mores, decision styles, and predispositions toward risk and 
uncertainty)
78
 and centrifugal forces.
79
 
 This leads to an emphasis on the role of social learning, ultimately 
culminating in a convergence of views among key participants, as a factor 
facilitating regime development.
80
  In itself that may prove to be an overly 
weak formulation, because social learning in a decentralized global setting 
is fundamentally a spontaneous process lacking a strong engine to propel it 
                                                 
 72.  See id. ("[T]he structure of the international system is determined by the 
capabilities of the states/units in the system.  Capabilities can change and therefore the 
composition or balance of the international system can change."). 
 73.  See id. ("[E]ven neorealism only accounts for short-lived and purely interest-
oriented cooperation.  Therefore it cannot explain the web of international environmental 
cooperation that has developed in this century."). 
 74. Id. at 13–14. 
 75.  See O’NEILL, supra note 63, at 7–20 (discussing various schools of thought related 
to international environmental politics); YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 
23, at 95–98 (elaborating on cognitivist philosophy).  
 76.  See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 95 ("The 
cognitivists . . . do not accept the characterization of the parties to regime formation as 
unitary actors weighing the costs and benefits of alternative institutional options in a 
synoptic manner."). 
 77.  See id. ("The cognitivists . . . reject the idea that the participants in the process of 
regime formation possess well-defined preference structures that are not subject to change 
during the course of the process."). 
 78.  See id. ("[T]he cognitivists . . . see forces at work in efforts to form international 
regimes or governance systems that cannot be captured in the calculations of the power 
theorists or the utilitarians.  These forces include belief systems, decision cultures or styles, 
and attitudes toward risk and uncertainty.").  
 79. Id.  
 80.  See id. at 95–96 ("One prominent theme is the role of a form of social learning that 
can give rise to consensual knowledge . . . .  On this account, a convergence of views among 
the principal participants is a prerequisite for success in the process of regime formation.").  




  For this reason, the notion of epistemic communities is invoked 
by those who subscribe to the cognitivist paradigm.
82
  Such communities 
consist of coalitions of professional experts and policy makers, normally 
transnational in scope, who share a common understanding of the 
underlying problem and the remedies called for.
83
  They go to great lengths 




 The application of these three theoretical perspectives in 
environmental contexts has not been a resounding success.
85
  As noted 
earlier, one difficulty associated with the utilitarian model lies in the 
assumption that the preference orderings of participants in institutional 
processes is comprehensively known and completely invariant.
86
  To 
complicate matters, it is unrealistically posited that their identity may be 
established at the outset and remains intact in the course of the negotiations; 
the alternatives/ strategies available to them are fully specified; and the 
outcome of each potential course of action is beyond doubt.
87
 
 Realist constructions may generate useful insights in policy domains 
(e.g., economic and military affairs) where power is the dominant factor 
shaping behavior.
88
  This is not thought to be the case in the environmental 
sphere.
89
  Hegemonic impulses seem to have been relatively muted in that 
area.  Moreover, the apparently omnipotent States have often played a 
                                                 
 81.  See id. at 96 ("[T]his line of thought . . . seems to rely on a spontaneous process 
that has no engine to drive it.").  
 82.  See id. ("Concern with this problem has given rise to a growing literature on the 
role that epistemic communities play in the process of regime formation."). 
 83.  See id. ("On this account, epistemic communities are coalitions of scientists and 
policymakers—usually transnational in scope—who share a common understanding of the 
nature of the problem and appropriate solution and who make a concerted effort to inject 
their point of view into the process of regime formation."). 
 84.  See id. at 95–98 (elaborating on cognitivist philosophy); KUTTING, supra note 63, 
at 20–21 (providing an assessment of epistemic communities); O’NEILL, supra, note 63, at 
7–20 (discussing various schools of thought related to international environmental politics). 
 85.  See KUTTING, supra note 63, at 14–15 (critiquing the neorealist approach); 
O’NEILL, supra note 63, at 7–20 (discussing various schools of thought related to 
international environmental politics); YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, 
at 91–95 (analyzing international regime governance); Young & Osherenko, supra note 63, 
at 11–13 (discussing interest-based hypotheses). 
 86.  See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 93 (discussing 
assumptions related to utilitarian modes of regime formation). 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  See KUTTING, supra note 63, at 12–13 (providing an overview of realism); 
O’NEILL, supra note 63, at 7–20 (assessing various schools of thought related to 
international environmental politics); YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, 
at 87–91 (discussing attributes of realism); Young & Osherenko, supra note 63, at 9–11 
(elaborating on power-based hypotheses).   
 89.  See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 87–91(discussing 
attributes of realism). 
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limited role in regime development, allowing intergovernmental 
organizations and/or international nongovernmental organizations to 
exercise leadership or at least act as the principal catalyst for change.
90
 
 Despite their appeal as an antidote to reductionist utilitarian and realist 
formulations, cognitivist models are not without shortcomings.
91
  They may 
have not served ecological researchers well by proving excessively 
ambiguous, notoriously difficult to operationalize, and of little practical 
value.
92
  Where operationalization has presented a surmountable problem, 
the evidence has generally not supported the arguments put forth with 
respect to environmental governance regimes.
93
  Cognitivists have also 
treated the use of expert/policy knowledge as a strictly normative and 
technical issue, stripping the process of its political dimensions.
94
 
B. A Dominant Perspective? 
 Neoliberal institutionalism purports to overcome the limitations of the 
three basic approaches outlined above.  The liberal element reflects a 
worldview that is more open to acknowledging the extent to which 
cooperation prevails in the global arena, and embrace the logic 
underpinning this phenomenon, than the conceptually more restrictive 
(utilitarian, realist, and neorealist) perspectives.
95
  The fundamental thesis is 
that States are highly interdependent and thus have a powerful incentive to 
collaborate in order to obtain joint, or absolute, benefits for the international 
community as a whole.
96
 
 In the absence of an overarching sovereign authority, the threat of 
anarchy is a looming danger for global society and a potentially costly 
prospect for its members.
97
  The high degree of decentralization makes it 
                                                 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  See KUTTING, supra note 63, at 20–21 (providing an assessment of epistemic 
communities); O’NEILL, supra note 63, at 7–20 (discussing various schools of thought 
related to international environmental politics); YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, 
supra note 23, at 95–98 (assessing the cognitivist model); Young & Osherenko, supra note 
63, at 19–20 (elaborating on knowledge-based hypotheses).   
 92.  See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 95–98 (assessing the 
cognitivist model). 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  See O'NEILL, supra note 60, at 10–11 ("[Liberal theorists believe that] [i]n a world 
where countries depend on one another for mutual peace and prosperity, there is a strong 
incentive to work together to achieve joint, or absolute, gains for the international 
community."). 
 96.  See Paterson, supra note 60, at 55–59 ("[F]or liberal institutionalists, 
interdependence . . . makes it rational in many instances to cooperate."). 
 97.  See O’NEILL, supra note 60, at 10 ("For theorists in the neoliberal institutionalist 
tradition, anarchy is a problem in that the absence of a sovereign authority makes it easy—
and desirable—for states to cheat on mutual agreements."). 
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tempting and easy for States not to enter into collective accords and renege 
on their commitments.
98
  Specifically, a single State may free-ride on 
international agreements, capturing the benefits derived therefrom without 
incurring any material obligations.
99
  Under this scenario, inter-party 
cooperation is a remote possibility.
100
  Precisely for that reason, recognizing 
their dependency upon each other in a complex yet fragile global setting, 
States seek to collaborate with the aim of realizing mutual gains and 
avoiding the consequences of parochial maneuvering.
101
 
 Institutional-building is the principal strategy employed to this end.  
Elaborate organizational mechanisms are created to perform a variety of 
stability-enhancing functions such as increasing transparency, reducing the 
transaction costs of cooperation, monitoring compliance, undertaking 
enforcement, and preventing cheating.
102
  The institutions that result from 
this collective effort "are social practices consisting of easily recognized 
roles coupled with clusters of rules or conventions governing relations 
among the occupants of these roles.  The rules that link institutionalized 
roles and . . . form the superstructure of institutions ordinarily encompass 




 International law, which is rooted in Grotian philosophy, embodies the 
characteristics of an institutional approach, in the neoliberal sense of the 
term, to the study of ecological degradation.
104
  It addresses descriptively, 
analytically, and prescriptively the principles, norms, and rules that govern 
relations between States.
105
  It blends static and dynamic perspectives, and 
                                                 
 98.  See Stephen D. Krasner, AEI Conference Trends in Global Governance:  Do They 
Threaten American Sovereignty?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 231, 233 (2000) (discussing the power 
dynamic between the United States and other countries).  
 99.  See O’NEILL, supra note 60, at 10 ("Thus, a single state can free-ride on an 
international agreement, and receive the benefits from it without paying any costs of 
adjustment."). 
 100.  See id. ("Under this scenario, no state cooperates, hoping instead to free-ride on 
the actions of others."). 
 101.  See id. ("Therefore, neoliberal institutionalists look for ways to mitigate these 
problems.").   
 102.  See id. ("They see international cooperation succeeding when states can work 
together to realize joint gains, and when institutions are set up that can monitor compliance, 
increase transparency, reduce the transactions costs of cooperation, and prevent most, if not 
all, cheating."). 
 103.  YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 12, at 32. 
 104.  See KUTTING, supra note 60, at 15 ("The legal approach has been included under 
the neoliberal institutionalist rubric because of its shared origins in the Grotian philosophy of 
international law."). 
 105.  See id. ("International law is defined as a system of rules and principles that 
govern the international relations between states.  These rules are created by states for states 
and cover almost any aspect of inter-state relationships." (citations omitted)) . 
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focuses on actor behavior and processes.
106
  It seems to promote orderly 
collaboration in the global arena through institutional channels, albeit in 
accordance with a predominantly legal logic (i.e., by incorporating few 
insights from other academic disciplines).
107
 
 A somewhat broader form of neoliberal institutionalism is the 
modified realist/ structuralist variant, which eclectically draws on several 
intellectual sources.
108
  The overall orientation is rationalist, but with less 
attention to pure power politics, and greater emphasis on inter-party 
cooperation.
109
  The approach is not rigidly State-centric (an attribute it 
shares with cognitivism) in that the role played by other actors (e.g., civil 
society) in regime development is duly recognized.
110
  While negotiated 
governance systems, in the environmental domain and elsewhere, are 
regarded as the product of bargaining/negotiation (although involving at 




 The modified realist/structuralist perspective has a number of salient 
features.  The number of players engaged in bargaining typically exceeds 
two.
112
  It may amount to a merely handful of participants (such as the four 
States that negotiated the fur seal regime) or constitute a larger group but 
one relatively modest in size (such as the sixteen contracting parties to the 
regime for Antarctic marine living resources or the twenty-seven 
signatories to the 1987 protocol to the ozone depletion convention).
113
  In 
certain circumstances, a very substantial number of participants (e.g., over 
150, as in the efforts to forge a governance structure for deep seabed mining 
in the context of the law of the sea negotiations) may contribute to the 
process of the development of an institutionally-grounded environmental 
                                                 
 106.  See id. at 16 ("As compared to various [International Relations] approaches, the 
international law perspective analy[z]es processes as well as actor behavio[]r."). 
 107.  See id. at 15–17 (explaining the legal approach of neoliberal institutionalism). 
 108.  See id. at 17 (suggesting that the concept of regime was first introduced in the 
1970s by Ruggie, and later narrowed down by Krasner in the 1980s). 
 109.  See id. at 18 ("The modified/structuralist view of regime theory . . . moves away 
from the idea of pure power politics to more functional areas of international 
cooperation . . . .").  
 110.  See id. ("The basic approach of the modified realist view is state-centric although 
it takes into account the existence of non-state actors . . . .").  
 111.  See id. ("Regimes are seen as the result of bargaining and negotiations and these 
results are often, but not necessarily, analy[z]ed in a game theoretical framework."). 
 112.  See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, at 99 ("Although there 
may be disagreement . . . regarding the identity of the actors that participate in specific cases, 
efforts to devise international regimes generally involve several autonomous parties."). 
 113.  See id. ("There may be only a handful, such as the four states that negotiated the 
fur seal regime, or a modest number, such as the sixteen parties to the regime for Antarctic 
marine living resources or the twenty-seven parties to the 1987 protocol to the ozone 
depletion convention."). 




  The corollary is that, "analytic constructs closely 
tied to a two-party view of the world, like the Edgeworth box, cannot carry 




 By the same token, the multilateral bargaining that takes place in such 
broadly-based and loosely-organized settings does not offer ample scope 
for generating insights derived from rigorous game-theoretic treatments of 
n-party situations which are geared toward identifying winning coalitions as 
well as those most likely to come into existence.
116
  Unlike in other 
institutional circumstances, where this type of problem structuring and 
conceptual manipulation is potentially relevant and useful, attempts to 
establish environmental governance regimes are normally aimed at arriving 
at arrangements acceptable to as many parties involved in the negotiations 
as possible.
117
  The pertinent criterion guiding behavior is a consensus rule 
rather than one founded on majoritarian principles.
118
  Parties likely to 




 The likelihood of success in such a milieu is typically greater than 
envisioned by game theorists operating within the confines of highly 
stylized models.  The reason lies in the fact that player interactions in the 
environmental domain provide considerable scope for integrative (or 
productive) bargaining as distinct from distributive (or positional) give-and-
take.
120
  Since the parties involved in this type of mixed-motive maneuvers 
do not embark on a search for a satisfactory outcome with a fixed and 
invariant negotiation set (or contract curve), they are better motivated to 
                                                 
 114.  See id. ("In extreme cases, more than 150 states may be involved, as in the efforts 
to work out a deep seabed mining regime in the context of the law of the sea negotiations."). 
 115.  Id.  
 116.  See id. ("[T]he multilateral interactions involved in regime formation do not lend 
themselves well to analysis in terms of the usual game-theoretic treatments of n-party 
situations which center on the identification of winning coalitions coupled with efforts to 
single out those coalitions that are most likely to form.").  
 117.  See id. ("Unlike the situation prevailing in most municipal legislatures, efforts to 
form international regimes generally focus on the formulation of arrangements acceptable to 
as many of those engaged in the negotiations as possible."). 
 118.  See id. at 99–100 ("This is tantamount to saying that institutional bargaining in 
international society operates on the basis of a consensus rule in contrast to a majoritarian 
rule or some other decision rule justifying a focus on the development of winning 
coalitions."). 
 119.  See id. at 100. ("Those negotiating the terms of international regimes may seek to 
exclude parties deemed likely to object to any reasonable institutional arrangements or 
threaten to go forward with particular arrangements regardless of the opposition of one or 
more parties."). 
 120.  See id. ("The resultant negotiations are saved from certain failure because regime 
formation in international society typically provides considerable scope for integrative (or 
productive) bargaining in contrast to distributive (or positional) bargaining."). 
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engage in exploratory exchanges designed to pinpoint opportunities for 
striking mutually beneficial deals.
121
 
 The participants in this open-ended process may never unambiguously 
identify the locus of the negotiation set (or the actual shape of the contract 
curve) and they may consequently, and inelegantly by game-theoretic 
standards, arrive at solutions that are Pareto-inferior in the sense that they 
leave feasible joint games on the table.
122
  Be that as it may, those players 
are less likely to become embroiled in lengthy and unfruitful negotiations 
that produce recurrent and unbreakable gridlocks stemming from recourse 
to strategic behavior and committal tactics whose purpose is to secure 
advantages for one party or another.
123
 
 The development of environmental governance regimes is an uncertain 
enterprise in that the participants confront an ill-defined and fluid picture 
or, in technical parlance, a "veil of uncertainty"
124
 that renders it difficult 
for them "to foresee how the operation of institutional arrangements will 
affect their interests over time."
125
  Paradoxically, this is deemed to be a 
positive feature of a highly challenging and seemingly intractable situation, 
for the inability of individual parties to predict with any precision the 
impact of a set of potential arrangements on their own welfare predisposes 
them, in a Rawlsian fashion,
126
 toward seeking configurations that are 




                                                 
 121.  See id. at 100–01 ("Negotiators who do not start with a common understanding of 
the contours of the contract curve or the locus of the negotiation set . . . have strong 
incentives to engage in exploratory interactions to identify opportunities for devising 
mutually beneficial deals."); YOUNG, CREATING REGIMES, supra note 21, at 11–15 
(explaining the negotiation phase of international regime formation); Young & Osherenko, 
supra note 21, at 13 ("[T]he thicker the veil of uncertainty, the easier it will be for parties to 
approach the problem under consideration as an integrative exercise."). 
 122.  See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, at 101 ("Such 
negotiators may never discover the actual shape of the contract curve or locus of the 
negotiation set, and they may consequently end up with arrangements that are Pareto-inferior 
in the sense that they leave feasible joint gains on the table."). 
 123.  See id. ("At the same time, however, they are less likely to engage in negotiations 
that bog down into protracted stalemates brought about by efforts to improve the outcome 
for one party or another through initiatives involving strategic behavior and committal 
tactics."). 
 124.  See id. at 101–02 (explaining the "veil of uncertainty"). 
 125.  Young & Osherenko, supra note 21, at 13. 
 126.  See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136–42 (1971) (stating that 
society should be built in a way that is fair for everyone). 
 127.  See YOUNG, CREATING REGIMES, supra note 21, at 11–15 ("The participants 
seldom have a clear picture of the payoff possibility set when they embark on negotiations; 
much of the negotiation process is exploratory in nature and involves efforts to expand the 
range of possibilities available."); YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, at 
101–02 (discussing the "veil of uncertainty"); Young & Osherenko, supra note 21, at 13 
("Individual parties’ inability to predict a regime’s impact on their welfare increases 
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 The flexible and restrained mixed-motive bargaining conducted under 
a veil of uncertainty, in scenarios bearing the hallmarks of neoliberal 
institutionalism, has a number of additional noteworthy characteristics.  
Elaborate inter-party negotiations coincide with extensive intra-party give-
and-take.
128
  In recognition of the relevance of some ideas put forth by 
cognitivists, the transnational environmental and scientific (i.e., epistemic) 
communities are seen as playing a tangible, albeit one not readily amenable 




 The inter-party and intra-party connection is merely one of a number 
of significant cross-area/cross-event linkages that complicate the bargaining 
process.  Unlike in the more parsimonious utilitarian models, negotiations 
revolving around environmental issues are not comfortably self-
contained.
130
  According to neoliberal institutionalists, they are often 
undertaken in a wider context where there are close linkages to other items 
on the domestic and/or international agendas.
131
  This may impede or 
facilitate the development of an ecologically-centered governance regime, 




 Given the pervasiveness of such intricate structural patterns, success 
may elude the architects of a negotiated environmental governance regime, 
possibly for a meaningful period of time.  It is posited that a satisfactory 
outcome is more likely to materialize when the following conditions 
prevail:  (1) the issues at stake lend themselves to treatment in a 
contractarian mode
133
; (2) arrangements are available that all participants 
                                                                                                                 
incentives to formulate provisions that are fair or equitable, which raises the probability that 
the parties can come up with institutional arrangements that are acceptable to all."). 
 128.  See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, at 104 ("Internal splits 
between industrialists and environmentalists are common in connection with most pollution-
control arrangements."). 
 129.  See id. at 103–05 ("[I]t would be a serious mistake to overlook the role of 
transnational alliances among influential interest groups in developing and maintaining 
governance systems at the international level."). 
 130.  See id. at 105–06 ("Whereas the vision of negotiation incorporated in the 
mainstream utilitarian models emphasize self-contained interactions, institutional bargaining 
in the formation of international governance systems almost always features a rich array of 
linkages to other events occurring in the socioeconomic or political environment."). 
 131.  See id. (providing examples of various ways in which negotiations may link 
domestic or international agendas). 
 132.  See id. ("Sometimes these linkages pose more or less serious problems for those 
seeking to establish institutional arrangements at the international level . . . .  In some cases, 
however, linkages work in favor of efforts to form international regimes."). 
 133.  See id. at 107–09 ("Institutional bargaining can succeed only when the issues at 
stake lend themselves to treatment in a contractarian mode." (emphasis omitted)).  
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may accept as equitable
134
; (3) salient solutions (or focal points) describable 
in simple terms may be identified
135
; (4) clear-cut and reliable compliance 
mechanisms may be devised
136
; (5) exogenous shocks galvanize the players 
involved into action
137




In addition to endeavoring to shed light on the formation of environmental 
governance regimes, neoliberal institutionalists have sought to explain their 
change over time/transformation, or "significant alterations in a regime’s 
structure of rights and rules, the character of its social-choice procedures, 
and the nature of its compliance mechanisms."
139
  They have generally 
divided the factors accounting for regime dynamics into endogenous and 
exogenous.
140




 Attempts have been made in this context to construct models capturing 
the essence of endogenous transformation.
142
  Some have been directed at 
establishing the extent to which the key components of a regime may be 
displaced before the whole structure unravels rather than shifts back toward 
a point of equilibrium.
143
  This approach builds upon the reaction-process 
models devised by social scientists exploring the evolution of arms races.
144
  
An alternative form of rigorous conceptualization has reflected systems 
thinking predicated on the assumption that the internal contradictions 
leading to regime transformation may be effectively dissected by embracing 
                                                 
 134.  See id. at 109–10 ("The availability of arrangements that all participants can accept 
as equitable is necessary for institutional bargaining to succeed." (emphasis omitted)).  
 135.  See id. at 110–11 ("The identification of salient solutions . . . describable in simple 
terms increases the probability of success in institutional bargaining." (emphasis omitted)).  
 136.  See id. at 111–12 ("The probability of success in institutional bargaining rises 
when clear-cut and reliable compliance mechanisms are available." (emphasis omitted)).  
 137.  See id. at 112–14 ("Exogenous shocks or crises increase the probability of success 
in efforts to negotiate the terms of governance systems." (emphasis omitted)). 
 138.  See id. at 114–15 ("Institutional bargaining cannot succeed in the absence of 
effective entrepreneurial leadership on the part of individuals." (emphasis omitted)).  
 139.  YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 12, at 96. 
 140.  See id. at 96–100 ("These processes sometimes revolve around factors that are 
endogenous to specific institutional arrangements . . . .  An alternative type of process 
leading to regime transformation places greater emphasis on factors that are exogenous to 
specific institutional arrangements."). 
 141.  See id. at 96–97 ("Some regimes harbor internal contradictions that eventually lead 
to serious failures and mounting pressures for major alterations."). 
 142.  See id. at 97 ("Several approaches to the analysis of these internal contradictions 
seem worth pursuing."). 
 143.  See id. ("[By] treating any given regime as a system of action, we can ask how far 
its central elements can be displaced before the system blows up rather than moves back 
toward a point of equilibrium."). 
 144.  See id. ("Perhaps the best known example of this approach at the international 
level involves the reaction-process models devised by Richardson for the analysis of arms 
races."). 
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a holistic perspective (e.g., some type of dialectical reasoning geared 
toward identifying system-wide tensions responsible for institutional 
instability, as well as a host of related socio-physical phenomena).
145
 
 Other approaches to regime transformation focus on factors that are 
exogenous to specific institutional arrangements.  This may include shifts in 
the structure of power,
146
 adjustments in the nature and distribution of 
technology,
147
 substantial shifts in domestic priorities,
148




 Environmental governance regimes do not function in a strategic 
vacuum.  The corollary is that meaningful adjustments in the structure and 
modus operandi of one set of institutional arrangements may impinge on 
those of another.
150
  The accentuation of this type of interdependence is a 
salient feature of the neoliberal institutional paradigm.  It remains to be 
seen if and to what extent the experience of contemporary China may lend 
selective support to the assumptions underlying this school of thought. 
 
III. Chinese Lessons 
A. Looking Inward 
 The first observation to be made in this context is that China’s 
ecological history since the Communist Revolution suggests that the 
concept of an environmental governance regime is less readily amenable to 
analytical manipulation in circumstances where domestic issues are 
grappled with than in situations involving international questions.  It is not 
easy to discern well-defined institutional patterns on the home front that 
may have become entrenched for a period of time and trace with 
                                                 
 145.  See id. ("Alternatively, it may prove helpful to examine internal contradictions 
leading to regime transformation in terms of the holistic perspective associated with 
dialectical reasoning."). 
 146.  See id. at 98 ("There can be no doubt . . . that . . . changes in the regime set forth in 
the International North Pacific Fisheries Convention emerged directly from the expanding 
influence of the United States over the marine fisheries of the region."). 
 147.  See id. at 99 ("[T]he advent of large stern trawlers and factory ships after World 
War II decisively undermined many unrestricted property regimes governing marine 
fisheries, which had performed at least tolerably for a long time."). 
 148.  See id. at 100 ("There can be no doubt . . . that growing attachments to policies 
aimed at full employment and social welfare at the domestic level have played a significant 
role in rendering fixed exchange rates unworkable in the international monetary regime."). 
 149.  See id. ("Much the same is true of major increases in demand for certain renewable 
resources arising from overall populating growth or sharp shifts in tastes among 
consumers."). 
 150.  See id. ("[A]ny success in efforts to modify the existing regime for whaling that 
have the effect of encouraging the growth of stocks of great whales will have important 
implications for arrangements governing the harvest of renewable resources such as krill, in 
the Southern Ocean.").   
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considerable precision the transformation of these patterns.  Domestic 
governance regimes appear to lack the compactness and transparency of 
their international counterparts. 
It would be tempting to conclude that attention should focus on attributes of 
institutional constellations that reflect fundamental attitudes toward 
society’s relationship with nature.
151
  It could thus be tentatively posited 
that since 1949, Chinese environmental policies were initially pursued 
within a strategic framework underpinned by the principle of coordinated 
development (whereby ecological impulses need to be aligned with 
economic ones),
152
 and that at some later juncture this has given way to 
greater commitment to the goal of sustainable development.
153
   
 The implication would be that policy content (or overall policy thrust) 
is the defining characteristic of a domestic environmental governance 
regime. 
The strength of the commitment to sustainable development is a moot point.  
Strategic rhetoric notwithstanding, the present policy constellation is at best 
akin in its focus to ecological modernization rather than a governance 
regime with more lofty environmental aspirations.  Those who shape it may 
increasingly, albeit by no means vigorously, seek compatibility between 
ecological preservation and economic growth, harnessing modern 
technology in the process, without blatantly subjugating the former to the 
latter.
154
  This is a more balanced approach to the relationship between 
                                                 
 151.  See ULRICH BRAND ET AL., CONFLICTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND THE 
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE STATE:  CONTESTED TERRAINS 9–52 (2008) (describing the 
regulation of nature in post-Fordism). 
 152.  See Michael Palmer, Environmental Regulation in the People’s Republic of China:  
The Face of Domestic Law, 156 CHINA Q. 788, 791–92 (1998) ("The conceptual device for 
the [Chinese] attitude to environmental protection was the principle of xietiao fazhan or ‘co-
ordinated development,’ under which environmental protection is given the same importance 
as the development of the national economy.").  See also Ouyang Kang & Meng Xiaokang, 
Environmental Protection:  The Theory, Technological Policies and Practice in China, in 
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY 97, 100 (Stuart S. Nagel ed., 1994) ("Since the 
founding of People’s Republic in 1949, the Chinese government has acknowledged the 
importance of environmental protection and has accordingly formulated a series of related 
policies, laws and regulations, including the ‘comprehensive utilization of industrial rubbish’ 
directive of 1956."). 
 153.  See ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK:  THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
CHALLENGE TO CHINA’S FUTURE 95–182 (2010) (describing China’s environmental problems 
and the consequent measures that its leaders have since implemented) ; GEOFFREY MURRAY 
& IAN G. COOK, GREEN CHINA:  SEEKING ECOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVES 178–224 (2002) 
(describing China’s recent environmental policies) . 
 154.  See Peter Ho, Trajectories for Greening in China:  Theory and Practice, 37 DEV. 
& CHANGE 3, 3–28 (2006) ("China is showing clear signs of greening as new institutions and 
regulations are created, environmental awareness increases and green technologies are 
implemented."); Arthur P.J. Mol, Equipment and Modernity in Transitional China:  
Frontiers of Ecological Modernization, 37 DEV. & CHANGE 29, 29–56 (2006) 
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society and nature than that witnessed during the 1949 to 1978 
revolutionary era and the early phases of the post-1978 reform period, but it 
does not amount to a solid commitment to sustainable development. 
 Environmental governance regimes may also be characterized in terms 
of the regulatory instruments relied upon by those who oversee them.
155
  
The commonly available classifications may be employed for this purpose.  
The mechanisms typically highlighted in that context, which are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, encompass command-and-control systems, 
self-regulation, enforced self-regulation, incentive-based strategies, market-
harnessing controls, disclosure procedures, direct action, rights and 
liabilities, and public insurance/compensation schemes.
156
 
 The regulatory architecture in China has been shifting in this respect.  
The penchant for command-and-control mechanisms has diminished and 
more flexible/indirect/versatile systems are being resorted to on a 
meaningful scale.
157
  Again, however, the patterns emerging (or, for that 
                                                                                                                 
("[E]nvironmental reforms in contemporary China can be interpreted as ecological 
modernization."). 
 155.  See, e.g., IAN BAILEY, NEW ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION:  POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PACKAGING 
WASTE DIRECTIVE 7–9 (2003) (introducing the effect of legislative instruments on 
environmental policies for EU countries); ‘NEW’ INSTRUMENTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
GOVERNANCE? NATIONAL EXPERIENCES AND PROSPECTS 81 (Andrew Jordan et al. eds., 2003) 
(examining the support and criticism for use of policy instruments in regulatory reform); 
NEW INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE EU 16–17 (Jonathan Golub ed., 
1998) (discussing generally the  pivotal role of instrument design in environmental 
governance regimes);  
 156.  See, e.g., ROBERT BALDWIN & MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION:  
THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 34–62 (1999) (analyzing different regulatory techniques 
in the form of industrial, economic, and social activities, e.g., commanding, deploying 
wealth, harnessing markets, control of information, acting directly, and conferring protected 
rights.); ANTHONY I. OGUS, REGULATION:  LEGAL FORM AND REGULATORY THEORY 121–261 
(2004) (describing the different forms of social regulation and their application); BRONWEN 
MORGAN & KAREN YEUNG, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND REGULATION:  TEXT AND 
MATERIALS 79–150 (2007) (focusing the discussion on control mechanisms in the scheme of 
regulatory reform). 
 157.  See generally CHINA’S ENVIRONMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT (Kristen A. Day ed., 2005) [hereinafter SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT] 
(discussing the recent changes to China’s environmental regulatory scheme and how they 
have affected "the relationship between development and the environment," focusing 
specifically on the shift from trading environmental damage for the sake of its own 
development); ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN CHINA (Neil T. Carter & Arthur P. J. Mol 
eds., 2007) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE] (evaluating the current steps under 
way to deal with challenges in the area of Chinese environmental policy in light of the 
accelerated economic development); XIAOYING MA & LEONARD ORTOLANO, 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CHINA:  INSTITUTIONS, ENFORCEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE 
(2000) (discussing the lack of improvement  in environmental quality in the face of actually 
improving regulatory structure and actual government commitment); Jolene Lin Shuwen, 
Assessing the Dragon’s Choice:  The Use of Market-Based Instruments in Chinese 
Environmental Policy, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 617 (2004) (examining the change in 
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matter, to have emerged) are not marked, at least at this juncture, by a high 
degree of coherence.
158
  It should be acknowledged by those who dissect 
these patterns that to paint them unambiguously would constitute a 
challenging task, in all likelihood an impossible one.  The corollary is that 
the subject may be conceptualized tentatively but perhaps not methodically. 
 Another strategy for addressing this issue centers on the prevalent 
form of environmental policy implementation.  Indeed, it has long been 
featured in the study of Chinese ecological management, albeit in an 
intermittent and selective fashion.
159
  As soon as the dust began to settle on 
the revolutionary era and reformist initiatives started to gain credibility, 
three contrasting public program execution modes, embraced to one degree 
or another during various periods by environmental planners in the country, 
were proposed:  the bureaucratic-authoritative, campaign-exhortation, and 
market-exchange types.
160
  As the appreciation of the institutional nuances 
                                                                                                                 
China’s environmental protection scheme from command-and-control policies to the 
"market-based instruments" proven successful in the United States). 
 158.  See generally ECONOMY, supra note 1533 (discussing recent improvements in 
China with regard to environmental protection:  the drive for green technology, activism of 
the country’s citizens, and the government’s to create eco-cities throughout the country); 
MURRAY & COOK, supra note 1533 (analyzing, along with their historical, political, 
economic, and cultural causes, current problems with China’s environment and the potential 
effects that the switch to a market-oriented economy will have on them); Roda Mushkat, 
Contextualizing Environmental Human Rights:  A Relativist Perspective, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 119 (2009) [hereinafter Mushkat, Contextualizing Environmental Human Rights] 
(looking at the possibility of a worldwide environmental governing body and what its 
existence means to global environmental governance); Roda Mushkat, Implementing 
Environmental Law in Transitional Settings:  The Chinese Experience, 18 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 45 (2008) [hereinafter Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Law] 
(attempting to give more substance to the legal analysis on Chinese ecological governance 
by providing background into the policy implementation that led that country to where it is 
today). 
 159.  See generally LESTER ROSS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN CHINA 11–24 (1988) 
(laying out the framework for three policy implementation types:  bureaucratic-authoritative, 
campaign-exhortation, and market-exchange) [hereinafter ROSS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN 
CHINA]; Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 75–78 
(summarizing Ross’s three policy implementation types); Christopher Tracy, Listening For 
Sounds of Fallen Trees:  The Principles on Forests and Lessons from Germany and China, 3 
DET. J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 469, 489–90 (1994) (citing to Ross’s book, but going further and 
equating an administrative scheme with each policy implementation type:  state with 
bureaucratic-administrative; collectivization with campaign-exhortation; and private with 
market-exchange).  
 160.  See ROSS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN CHINA, supra note 159, at 11–23 
(identifying the three "policy implementation type[s]"); Lester Ross, The Implementation of 
Environmental Policy in China:  A Comparative Perspective, 15 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 489, 490–
91 (1984) [hereinafter Ross, The Implementation of Environmental Policy in China] 
(introducing the "taxonomy of implementation types found in China"). 
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 Bureaucratic-authoritative implementation is characterized by a 
substantial measure of centralization, is comprehensive in scope, is driven 
by the ruling party, features obedience to authoritative commands, and is 
underpinned by a structure of State/collectively-focused property rights.
162
  
Execution of ecological strategies via campaign-exhortation is a 
centralized, uneven, ruling party-orchestrated, normatively-inspired (but 
coercion is also resorted to in order to secure compliance), and collectively-
oriented (verging on self-abnegation) affair.
163
  Implementation through 
market channels follows a decentralized, comprehensive, and materially-
incentivized model which, by definition, relegates the ruling party to the 




 Administrative decentralization should not be equated with genuine 
marketization.  On several occasions, including the early phases (pre-1994) 
of the reform era, power has been transferred from the political center in 
Beijing to the provinces (and other sub-national units) without any 
meaningful economic restructuring.
165
  Even the empowerment of State-
                                                 
 161.  See JINGLIAN WU, UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING CHINESE ECONOMIC 
REFORM 44–57 (2005) (giving background information for the period of "Administrative 
Decentralization" that occurred from 1958 to 1978) [hereinafter JINGLIAN WU]; Mushkat, 
Contextualizing Environmental Human Rights, supra note 158, at 153 (discussing, briefly 
the fiscal decentralization that occurred during "the early stages of the post-1978 
restructuring process"); Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 76–
77 (concluding that the "tripartite typology" established earlier by Ross is missing a crucial 
fourth implementation mode:  administrative decentralization, a policy structure embraced 
by Mao himself). 
 162.  See ROSS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN CHINA, supra note 159, at 11–15 (outlining 
the first of the three policy implementation types—bureaucratic-authoritative 
implementation). 
 163.  See id. at 15–20 (describing the second of the three policy implementation types—
campaign-exhortation implementation). 
 164.  See id. at 20–23 (outlining the final policy implementation type—market-exchange 
implementation). 
 165.  See generally ROSS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN CHINA, supra note 159 (giving 
general background information on Chinese environmental policy from the 1950s to the late 
1980s, and suggesting ways that policy can be tailored in the future to better suit 
environmental needs); JINGLIAN WU, supra note 161, at 43–89 (identifying the three periods 
of Chinese ecological reform:  "Administrative Decentralization (1958 to 1978)"; 
"Incremental Reform (1979-1993)"; and "[the] Strategy of ‘Overall Advance’ (1994 to 
present)"); Mushkat, Contextualizing Environmental Human Rights, supra note 158, at 156–
65 (analyzing the effects of Chinese ecological reforms on the environment itself); Mushkat, 
Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 77 (concluding that "[p]ower has 
markedly shifted from the center to the periphery, even more so in practice than in theory" in 
"the Chinese ecological governance architecture"); Ross, The Implementation of 
Environmental Policy in China, supra note 160 (analyzing Chinese environmental policy 
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owned enterprises (SOEs) does not amount to economic decentralization if 
market channels are not restored and allowed to function autonomously.  It 
has been argued, albeit not conclusively, that market-exchange is the most 
effective system for implementing ecological strategy in China and that 
alternative models should be jettisoned.
166
  
 Policy execution patterns and regulatory instruments are not 
independent of each other.  The movement away from command-and-
control techniques in the Chinese context has been associated with a shift 
toward less bureaucratic/authoritarian forms of environmental policy 
implementation.
167
  Yet a rigidly top-down approach was not the sole 
strategy execution mechanism even during periods marked by intense 
revolutionary fervor (when recourse to campaign-exhortation and 
administrative decentralization was common).
168
  By the same token, the 
                                                                                                                 
implementation first in the three policy implementation types, then by its effects on changes 
in strategy, and concluding that market-based implementation is the most favorable). 
 166.  See ROSS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN CHINA, supra note 159, at 184–87 
(advocating for a market-exchange approach to deal with environmental policy issues in 
China); JINGLIAN WU, supra note 161, at 415–16 (arguing that a market-enhancing view is 
favorable over the market-friendly or developmental-state views); Mushkat, Implementing 
Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 75–78 (discussing generally the application of the 
three different models for policy implementation);  Ross, The Implementation of 
Environmental Policy in China, supra note 160, at 508–12 (arguing that while bureaucratic 
and campaign based implementation types are more politically acceptable, the market-
exchange implementation model is more flexible, efficient, and innovative, and has a 
substantially wider application in practice). 
 167.  See ECONOMY, supra note 153, at 135–75 (discussing the new political 
environment in China’s environmental policy landscape and introducing three influential 
activists and the specific changes that they have made); KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING 
CHINA:  FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 279–88 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter 
LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA] (discussing Chinese environmental reform after 1978 and 
the current state of environmental policy); MURRAY & COOK, supra note 153, at 210–24 
(predicting a number of future possibilities for China’s environmental policy, ranging from 
"Rosy" to "Doomsday"); BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY:  TRANSITIONS AND 
GROWTH 502–03 (2007) (discussing the increased incidence of civilian input in the 
environmental policy decision-making process, signifying a shift away from an authoritarian 
policy decision-making process); Mushkat, Contextualizing Human Rights, supra note 158, 
at 66 (quoting a survey of policy shifts that show a change from "command and control 
methods to one primarily relying . . . on market-harnessing techniques"); Mushkat, 
Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 20–23 (arguing for economic and 
governmental decentralization as a solution for policy implementation issues). 
 168.  See LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA, supra note 167, at 282–84 (discussing 
China’s "move away from centralized planning" and its positive effects on environmental 
policy).  See generally ECONOMY, supra note 153, at 91–175 (discussing the economic 
impact of Chinese environmental issues along with proposals for how China should proceed 
in developing a sound, effective environmental policy regime); MURRAY & COOK, supra 
note 153, at 178–224 (analyzing a variety of Chinese environmental policies and how they 
were implemented); NAUGHTON, supra note 167 (giving a recent history of China’s 
economy, focusing specifically on how it has affected the environment, and proposing 
alternatives that will better both China’s economy and the environment); Mushkat, 
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post-1978 configuration has been a hybrid and this is likely to remain the 
case for the foreseeable future.
169
 
 A new analytical tool for capturing the essence of environmental 
governance regimes is the concept of regulatory style.  It has been applied 
intensively in the European context where the tension between centripetal 
and centrifugal forces has not abated despite the presence of substantial 
unifying impulses.
170
  In this politico-geographic domain: 
 
"[e]ach nation has a distinct regulatory style, which is a 
function of its more general policy style, and which causes 
the environment to be regulated very much in the same way 
as other areas of corporate conduct. . . .  It can sometimes 
be more difficult to define a common EU policy given such 
differences in regulatory traditions, than it is to reconcile 





The notion of regulatory style has been decomposed along two dimensions.  
First, it has been assumed that a government’s approach to problem solving 
may range from reactive (e.g., United Kingdom) to anticipatory (e.g., 
                                                                                                                 
Contextualizing Human Rights, supra note 158 (discussing international proposals for 
environmental law reform, with detail paid to China for a specific example of how Northern 
and Western reformist schemes can be particularly beneficial);  Mushkat, Implementing 
Environmental Law, supra note 158 (concluding that failed execution has led to failures in 
the Chinese environmental governance scheme, but suggesting that certain reforms have and 
will continue to be successful in improving Chinese environmental regulation). 
 169.  See ECONOMY, supra note 153, at 95–133 (discussing the different ways that China 
is changing its environmental policies in its various branches of government, ranging from 
system-wide changes to specific mid-level changes in the legal system, Environmental 
Protection Bureaus, and the judiciary); LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA, supra note 167, at 
282–84 (summarizing the different post-1978 reforms and their positive and negative effects 
on the environment); MURRAY & COOK, supra note 153, at 178–224 (evaluating the more 
recent state of environmental policy in China and looking at the different modern reforms 
that have been made and their effects on the overall policy and environment as a whole); 
NAUGHTON, supra note 167, at 487–503 (discussing the intersection between the Chinese 
economic changes over the last 30 years and air and water pollution levels); Mushkat, 
Contextualizing Human Rights, supra note 158, at 160–65 (evaluating recent economic and 
political changes in China’s economy and the corresponding increases in ecological 
problems); Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 63–74 
(discussing the period after 1978 and the variety of changes that have been implemented in 
China’s environmental legal regime). 
 170.  See Mikael Skou Andersen & Duncan Liefferink, Introduction:  The Impact of 
Pioneers on EU Environmental Policy, in EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:  THE 
PIONEERS 1, 3–7 (Mikael Skou Andersen & Duncan Liefferink eds., 1997) (identifying 
"‘[e]xamples’ and ‘models’" for environmental policy, including the United States, Japan, 
and other EU countries). 
 171.  Id. at 6. 





  Second, it has been posited that a government’s relationship 
with other core non-governmental players may vary between consensual 
(e.g., United Kingdom) and impositional (e.g., Germany, other than in areas 
where corporatist structures facilitate input from employers and unions).
173
  
It has thus been poignantly noted that: 
 
"British legislation must appear to our fellow Europeans to 
be pragmatic, piecemeal, ad hoc, the product of 
expedience, not principle:  a policy to be described as a 
non-policy.  Yet British policy has deep roots in history.  It 
is the product of nearly two centuries of evolution in which 
impracticable ideas have been eliminated, Utopian 
aspirations have been discarded, and the policies which 




While fundamentally appealing, the concept of regulatory style has posed 
considerable practical challenges because of dynamic shifts and sectoral 
differences (e.g., "[b]road generalizations about a national style of policy-
making tend to obscure historical changes over time, variations between 
fields of policy and the differences in the roles of various parties").
175
  This 
has prompted some researchers to seek more specific patterns within well-
defined areas of government activity (but ones that are not necessarily 
stable, which is analytically less problematic than sectoral differences).  In 
the European context, the focus has thus moved from universal categories 
toward concretely expressed environmental standard-setting approaches.
176
 
                                                 
 172.  See generally POLICY STYLES IN WESTERN EUROPE (Jeremy Richardson ed., 1982) 
(discussing, in various articles, environmental policies in Western European countries, 
including Germany, Norway, Great Britain, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands). 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  ERIC ASHBY & MARY ANDERSON, THE POLITICS OF CLEAN AIR 152–53 (1981).  See 
also DAVID VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION:  ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN GREAT 
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 269–76 (1986) (discussing historical British policy style, 
which is characterized by five elements:  "sectorization, clientelism, 
consultation/negotiation, the institutionalization of compromise, and the development of 
exchange relationships"). 
 175.  KLAUS VON BEYME, Policy-Making in the Federal Republic of Germany:  A 
Systematic Introduction, in POLICY AND POLITICS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 1, 
18 (Klaus von Beyme & Manfred G. Schmidt eds., Eileen Martin trans., 1985). 
 176.  See generally TANJA A. BÖRZEL, ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERS AND LAGGARDS IN 
EUROPE:  WHY THERE IS (NOT) A ‘SOUTHERN PROBLEM’ (2003) (comparing environmental 
policy in Germany, seemingly the EU leader, with Spain, one of the problem countries with 
respect to compliance with EU environmental laws); PETER J. MAY ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE:  INTERGOVERNMENTAL APPROACHES TO HAZARDS AND 
SUSTAINABILITY (1996) (discussing policy changes in the United States, New Zealand, and 
Australia and how they have affected the environment and governmental landscape 
surrounding them, specifically as they relate to human interactions and governmental roles);  
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 The broadly based typology may not be entirely irrelevant for China in 
that its ecological strategies may have not yet acquired the degree of 
specificity observed elsewhere.  The policy framework is evolving in a 
more anticipatory and consensual (or, alternatively, less reactive and 
impositional) direction.  Yet, the picture is complex and fluid.
177
  The 
question arises again to what extent methodical (different from tentative) 
generalizations are possible for vast countries undergoing rapid socio-
economic transformation in an uneven fashion and whether any single 
concept (such as regulatory style) may adequately reflect the emerging 
patterns. 
 A dimension of environmental governance regimes which has 
attracted virtually no scholarly attention, but which has been a salient 
feature of the Chinese domestic scene, is the degree of outward orientation.  
During much of the revolutionary era the ecological management system, if 
any, was self-contained.
178
  It was intermittently and selectively opened to 
outside influences but seldom other than in an ad hoc manner and on a 
modest scale.
179
   The situation has changed materially, albeit gradually, 
following the adoption of reformist strategies emphatically favoring foreign 
investment and foreign trade.
180
  A policy of ecological 
                                                                                                                 
WURZEL, supra note 55 (comparing British and German environmental policy since 1972, 
with specific references to case studies on water and air pollution regulation). 
 177.  See ECONOMY, supra note 153, at 95–105 (outlining changes in the environmental 
policy framework over the last 30 years within the specific context of China’s participation 
in a number of international environmental conferences); LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA, 
supra note 167, at 290–91 (concluding that China’s environmental reforms can, over time, 
lead to a more efficient economy with substantially less environmental impact with the 
introduction of environmental education programs but that the current reforms will lead to 
increased environmental impact throughout the 1990s and early 2000s); BENJAMIN VAN 
ROOIJ, REGULATING LAND AND POLLUTION IN CHINA:  LAWMAKING, COMPLIANCE, AND 
ENFORCEMENT 45–49 (2006) (discussing the process by which China makes laws:  "Top-
Down, From Abstract and Weak to Specific and Strict"); Carlos Wing-Hung Lo et al., 
Changes in Enforcement Styles Among Environmental Enforcement Officials in China, 41 
ENV’T & PLAN. A 2706–23 (2009) (examining the ways that environmental enforcement 
officials changed styles from 2000 to 2006); Arthur P.J. Mol & Neil T. Carter, China’s 
Environmental Governance in Transition, in ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN CHINA (Neil 
T. Carter & Arthur P. J. Mol eds., 2007) (noting that China’s environmental policy has led to 
"greater decentrali[z]ation and flexibility whilst moving away from a rigid, hierarchical, 
command-and-control system of environmental governance"); Joshua Su-Ya Wu, The State 
of China’s Environmental Governance After the 17th Party Congress, 26 EAST ASIA 265–84 
(2009) (discussing changes proposed at the 17th Party Congress and whether these changes 
actually address problems with Chinese environmental governance). 
 178.  See ECONOMY, supra note 153, at 184–86 (marking 1972 as the year that China 
first entered the "arena of international environmental politics," suggesting that Chinese 
policy had been largely internalized before).  
 179.  See id., at 177–219 (discussing the extent to which China allows non-
governmental influences on its environmental policy and practice). 
 180.  See id. at 275–81 (establishing potential environmental benefits to the addition of, 
among other things, foreign trade and investment to China’s economy). 
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cooperation/engagement has been pursued with reasonable determination 
and there has been a general willingness, where appropriate, to draw 
lessons from the experience of other countries.
181
  This may not qualify as 
the defining characteristic of the governance regime, yet it is a notable one, 
an argument that may possibly be extended to all post-socialist (or better 
still, previously autarkic) societies. 
 The implication is that the descriptive propositions regarding the 
domestic institutional arrangements designed to promote environmental 
protection may be overly tight and not sufficiently comprehensive.  China is 
witnessing structural change by embracing—selectively, in an incremental 
fashion, and not uniformly—ecological modernization, indirect regulatory 
instruments, flexible and transparent forms of policy implementation, and 
sophisticated and progressive regulatory styles.  Nevertheless, these 
measures cannot be conceptualized in overly specific terms, must to be 
integrated, and need to be augmented by incorporating additional factors 
such as outward orientation.  The notion of a domestic environmental 
governance regime is viable but should be handled carefully. 
 The development (formation and transformation) of the Chinese 
ecological management system may also provide a fertile ground for 
generating new ideas with respect to the evolution of domestic 
environmental governance regimes.  This is the world’s most populous 
country, economically resurgent yet ecologically distressed.
182
  More 
importantly, it is an industrializing nation (rather than an industrialized 
one), it has not adopted democracy/ polyarchy, it has not moved decisively 
toward the rule of law (merely abandoning the rule of man in favor of a rule 
by law), it is a post-socialist society without qualifying as a capitalist one, 
and it has a unique institutional setup.
183
  This is a fundamentally different 
configuration from those encountered in countries typically featured in 
socio-legal studies in that field of inquiry.
184
 
                                                 
 181.  See generally id. at 195–213 (discussing the impact that other countries, 
multinational corporations, and international organizations have had on China’s policy of 
international cooperation, and mentioning specifically the United States, the United Nations, 
the World Bank, General Motors, General Electric, and Dow Chemical Company, among 
others). 
 182.  See Country and Areas Ranked by Population:  2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
INTERNATIONAL DATA BASE (2010), available at http://sasweb.ssd.census.gov/idb/ranks.html 
(finding that China’s population is 1.33 billion, over four times higher than the United States 
(third largest country in the world, by population) and over 100 million people more than the 
second largest country in the world, India) 
 183.  See Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, Economic Growth, Democracy, the Rule of 
Law, and China’s Future, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 229, 245–51 (2005) (identifying the 
significant evolution that has occurred within China’s economy). 
 184.  See, e.g., BÖRZEL, supra note 177, at 56–58 (comparing environmental policy in 
two largely socialist countries:  Germany, considered an environmental leader in Europe, 
and Spain, considered an "environmental laggard"); SCHREURS, supra note 55, at 241–61 
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 Perhaps the most telling observation is that the system appears to be 
predominantly exogenously driven, with endogenous factors playing a 
distinctly modest role.  This diminishes the lure of institutionalist 
explanations that focus on the impact of regime-specific 
principles/norms/rules/procedures on policy outputs (on the other hand, 
institutional theories that highlight the influence of socio-organizational 
settings may be of even greater relevance than elsewhere).  The underlying 
reason lies in the fact that the normative and structural underpinnings of the 
domestic environmental governance regime are exceptionally fragile.  Laws 
tend to be abstract, ambiguous, impractical, incoherent, ineffective, and out 
of sync with rapidly evolving socio-economic realities.
185
  The supporting 
organizational edifice (notably, the State Environmental Protection 
Administration/SEPA, the Environmental Protection Bureaus/EPBs, and the 




 In a post-socialist milieu, force-of ideas explanations, anchored in 
cognitivist rather than institutionalist models, merit closer attention than in 
Western democracies.
187
  Central planning, coupled with direct regulation 
and top-down implementation, was imported from the Soviet Union 
                                                                                                                 
(comparing environmental policy in the U.S., Japan, and Germany); VOGEL, supra note 174, 
at 146–92 (comparing environmental policy in the U.S. with that of Great Britain); WURZEL, 
supra note 55, at 4–18 (comparing German and British environmental policy styles); Jeremy 
Richardson, Gunnel Gustafsson, & Grant Jordan, The Concept of Policy Style, in POLICY 
STYLES IN WESTERN EUROPE 1, 1–14 (Jeremy Richardson, ed., 1982) (discussing 
environmental policy in a number of European countries, including Germany, Norway, 
Great Britain, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands). 
 185.  See Mushkat, Contextualizing Environmental Human Rights, supra note 158, at 
162 (discussing the flaws in Chinese environmental law making, specifically calling it "is a 
laborious process and the end product leaves much to be desired in terms of coherence"); 
Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 68 (characterizing Chinese 
laws as "overly ambiguous, non-transparent, provisional, and sermon-like"). 
 186.  See Mushkat, Contextualizing Environmental Human Rights, supra note 158, at 
161–64 (analyzing the organizational structure of Chinese governmental elements that play 
an important role in environmental policy-making and enforcement); Mushkat, 
Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 64–66 (outlining the general 
responsibilities of the individual governmental agencies and their impact on the greater 
organizational framework). 
 187.  See JINGLIAN WU, supra note 161, at 57–89 (discussing the reforms that took place 
following the socialist regime, beginning with the incremental reforms from 1979 to 1993 
through the "Overall Advance" strategy from 1994 to the present).  For background 
information about the period prior to the change from socialism, see LIEBERTHAL, 
GOVERNING CHINA, supra note 167, at 84–122, which summarizes the "Maoist Era"—the era 
that led up to the change from Communism to socialism, and NAUGHTON, supra note 167, at 
55–83, which discusses the Socialist era from 1949–1978, specifically the changes that led 
to the regime change and how they affected China’s economy. 
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following the Communist Revolution.
188
  Bottom-up mobilization of effort, 
via a one-off mixture of relentless moral suasion and intense psychological 
pressure, was a natural extension of revolutionary practices relied upon by a 
peasant movement in its struggle with Nationalist forces during the Civil 
War that erupted in 1927.
189
  Administrative decentralization, featuring a 
transfer of power from the political center to the regional/ industrial 
periphery (provinces and State-owned enterprises/SOEs) was also 




 By the same token, exogenously-determined, economy-wide, and idea-
inspired restructuring during the reform era, initially selective and slow-
paced (1979–1993), and subsequently wide-ranging and fast-moving 
(1994–present), has been a key factor shaping ecological initiatives.
191
  The 
                                                 
 188.  See LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA, supra note 167, at 53–56 (discussing the 
ways in which the Chinese Communist Party borrowed many of its policies and practices 
from the Soviet Union); NAUGHTON, supra note 167, at 59–62 (stating "China adopted the 
‘command economy’ system from the Soviet Union," and setting out the system’s 
fundamental characteristics). 
 189.  See LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA, supra note 167, at 43–47 (discussing the 
ways in which the Chinese lifestyle and economy was forced to adapt following the 1927 
Civil War); NAUGHTON, supra note 167, at 43–47 (discussing the residual effects of the 1927 
Civil War). 
 190.  See NAUGHTON, supra note 167, at 55–62 (describing the functions and strategy of 
a command economy, which China adopted from the Soviet Union); JINGLIAN WU, supra 
note 161, at 43–57 (identifying 1958 to 1978 as the period in which administrative 
decentralization was integral in the transferring power from the central government to lower 
level governments). 
 191.  See JINGLINAN WU, supra note 161, at 57–90 (discussing the reforms during the 
incremental period from 1979 to 1993 and the following period from 1994 to the present, 
where the emphasis was placed on overall reform with a focus on "urban areas and 
defin[ing] . . . a socialist commodity economy").  See generally ENVIRONMENTAL 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 157 (giving examples and history of recent Chinese environmental 
governance, the changes that have been made, and how these changes have affected the 
environment); LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA, supra note 167, at 273–88 (discussing the 
problems existing with China’s environment originating before 1978 and the  reforms that 
have been put in place since then); MA & ORTOLANO, supra note 157 (evaluating the ways 
that China has dealt with its serious environmental problems:  "a vast net-work of 
environmental protection agencies[,] . . . dozens of environmental laws and . . . eight major 
pollution control programs"); MURRAY & COOK, supra note 153 (discussing China’s 
environmental problems  with respect to industrialization, urbanization, and the change from 
centralized to a market-oriented economy);  NAUGHTON, supra note 167, at 487–504 
(identifying a variety of environmental problems, ranging from air and water pollution to the 
sustainability of forests and  water supply); SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 157 
(identifying China as a crucial player in the need to address outstanding environmental 
issues, specifically relating to regulation and governance);  Lin Shuwen, supra note 157 
(discussing the impact of market-based instruments since the 1972 Stockholm United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment); Mushkat, Contextualizing Environmental 
Human Rights, supra note 158 (discussing global environmental governance, with specific 
examples from China’s government and economy);  Mushkat, Implementing Environmental 
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shift toward indirect regulation, market-based implementation, anticipatory 
and consensual regulatory style, and international cooperation/engagement 
is largely attributable to such macro-level, seismic changes reflecting the 
jettisoning (in a stepwise fashion) of one overarching idea (a blend of 
central planning and collective property rights) in favor of another (a 




 Not all development strategies are alike.  Some industrializing nations 
have opted for balanced expansion.  By contrast, China’s reform drive has 
been loosely rooted in the idea of unbalanced growth, whereby resources 
are channeled more heavily toward certain segments of the economy than 
others.
193
  The asymmetry has also manifested itself in the delicate 
relationship between the economy and the ecosystem, with the former 
consistently looming larger on the policy agenda than the latter.  This has 
materially impeded the development of the domestic environmental 
governance regime during the revolutionary and reform eras, accounting for 
both its inadequate nature and constrained evolution.
194
 
 An industrializing nation is, by definition, one whose modernization is 
incomplete.  In such a setting, traditional attitudes persist.  Cognitivists may 
highlight the relevance for ecological progress of the importance accorded 
to social connections/guanxi (e.g., between regulator and regulatee), the 
pursuit of social harmony, the determination to avoid social conflict, the 
propensity toward compromise, and the preoccupation with saving face.
195
  
                                                                                                                 
Law, supra note 158 (discussing China’s implementation of new environmental regulations 
in the post-Mao era). 
 192.  See generally ECONOMY, supra note 153 (discussing the shift from a centralized to 
a market-based, decentralized economy, specifically relating to the environment and ways to 
improve on the new system and the environment as a whole); MA & ORTOLANO, supra note 
157 (addressing the significant environmental destruction that resulted from China’s market 
reforms and how the Chinese government is dealing with these problems through 
regulation); MURRAY & COOK, supra note 153 (analyzing specific environmental issues and 
how the regulatory environment surrounding them has changed and interacted with the 
introduction of market forces into the regime). 
 193.  See Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, The Political Economy of Chinese 
"Federalism":  New Analytical Directions, 38 GLOBAL ECON. REV. 13, 14 (2009) (addressing 
the "delicate balancing act" between the needs of the country and the "high degree of 
concentrate[ed] resources" at the center of the government). 
 194.  See id. at 17 (discussing the ways in which decentralization has affected the 
revolutionary era and the reform era that followed, specifically that regional development 
strategies have led to significant spatial disparities); see also ECONOMY, supra note 153, at 
62–64 (discussing the competing interests of economic advancement and success and the 
subsequent environmental effects that such economic changes have had on China’s 
environment); MURRAY & COOK, supra note 153, at 54–70 (discussing the effects that 
overproduction and production without any consideration for environmental impact can have 
on China’s environment). 
 195.  See MA & ORTOLANO, supra note 157, at 82–89 (discussing the relationship 
between social norms in China and the ecological process); BARBARA J. SINKULE & 
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They may also draw attention to the role played by cosmic resonance theory 
and neo-Confucianism.
196
  The precise effect of these lingering cultural 
influences is not easy to pinpoint, but it is commonly believed that they 
hinder the process of institutionalization.
197
 
Given the pervasive fragility and fragmentation of the Chinese 
organizational infrastructure, in the public sector in general
198
 and in the 
                                                                                                                 
LEONARD ORTOLANO, IMPLEMENTING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN CHINA 12–20 (1995) 
(discussing the interaction between environmental policy implementation and social norms 
in place in China); Peter Hills & C.S. Man, Environmental Regulation and the Industrial 
Sector in China: The Role of Informal Relationships in Policy Implementation, 7 BUS. 
STRATEGY & THE ENV’T 60–61 (1998) (identifying Chinese social concepts that influence the 
environmental implementation process). 
 196.  See Robert P. Weller & Peter K. Bol, From Heaven-and-Earth to Nature:  Chinese 
Concepts of the Environment and Their Influence on Policy Implementation, in ENERGIZING 
CHINA:  RECONCILING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 473, 473–83 
(Michael B. McElroy et al. eds., 1998) (describing the concepts of cosmic resonance theory 
and neo-Confucianism). 
 197.  See id. at 495–96 (offering two reasons why the two concepts are unsuccessful:  
first, these views "were developed to address the dominant concerns of political culture" and 
did not address environmental concerns; second, practices that emerged were used more for 
personal and political gain, rather than to positively impact environmental policy); see also 
MA & ORTOLANO, supra note 157, at 77–93, 161–69 (analyzing the ways that social 
behavior affects environmental regulatory acceptance, then comparing these social 
behavioral responses to similar situations in the United States); SINKULE & ORTOLANO, 
supra note 196, at 12–20, 46–50, 188–202 (discussing the social structure of Chinese 
organizations, how this social structure plays into policy implementation, and three 
programs that were locally designed to assist implementation); Hills & Man, supra note 196, 
at 59–61 (discussing the ways that environmental policy implementation interacts with four 
major Chinese social and industrial concepts:  "units (danwei), systems (xitong), ‘too many 
mothers in law’ (popo duo), and independent kingdoms (duli wangguo)"). 
 198.  See generally BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO 
CHINA (Kenneth G. Lieberthal & David M. Lampton eds., 1992) (outlining three major areas 
in the Chinese public regulatory environment:  national issues, the center (referring to the 
governmental structure and bureacracy), and bureaucratic clusters (referring more to 
individual governmental agencies and their interaction with the larger central government); 
KENNETH G. LIEBERTHAL & MICHEL OKSENBERG, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND CHINESE 
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT (1986) [hereinafter LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, BUREAUCRATIC 
POLITICS] (outlining a study done in the early 1980s to determine the inner workings of the 
Chinese bureaucratic system); KENNETH LIEBERTHAL & MICHEL OKSENBERG, POLICYMAKING 
IN CHINA:  LEADERS, STRUCTURES, AND PROCESSES (1988) [hereinafter LIEBERTHAL & 
OKSENBERG, POLICYMAKING IN CHINA] (expanding their earlier study, with the following 
purpose:  "to illuminate how the bureaucratic structure of the state, policy processes, and 
outcomes are interrelated in contemporary China"); POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN POST-MAO 
CHINA (David M. Lampton ed., 1987) (discussing and identifying the different policy types 
in China:  planning and economic, resource, rural sector, and education and science); David 
M. Lampton, Chinese Politics:  The Bargaining Treadmill, 23 ISSUES & STUD. 11 (1987) 
(concluding that the Chinese political system is one of bargaining, rather than a command 
system). 
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environmental domain in particular,
199
 the models typically invoked by 
institutionalists to explain ecological agenda setting and transformation 
(and thus the development of governance regimes) may have gaps.  Such 
models fall into three general categories:  pluralist, elitist, and sub-
governmental.
200
  The first of these analytical constructs is based on 
theories of American democracy formulated approximately half a century 
ago.
201
  In this somewhat romanticized view of a polyarchical form of 




 By contrast, proponents of the elitist, or hierarchical, theory of agenda 
setting and transformation argue that power is concentrated in the hands of 
the few.
203
  Political elites wield authority over a multitude lacking ready 
access to the corridors of power.
204
  The authority structure resembles a 
                                                 
 199.  See generally ECONOMY, supra note 153 (discussing the Chinese political 
landscape in more precise terms, dealing specifically with the environment and how it will 
be affected in the future); GØRILD HEGGELUND, ENVIRONMENT AND RESETTLEMENT POLITICS 
IN CHINA:  THE THREE GORGES PROJECT (2004) (looking into one of the more significant 
events in Chinese ecological history:  The Three Gorges Dam, a controversial dam 
constructed on the Yangtze River); MA & ORTOLANO, supra note 157 (discussing the state of 
Chinese environmental regulation); MURRAY & COOK, supra note 153 (giving a historical 
overview of China’s environmental problems, then discussing how politics and market 
forces have shaped the state of environmental governance today); SINKULE & ORTOLANO, 
supra note 196 (discussing the methods available for environmental policy implementation 
in China); Kenneth Lieberthal, China’s Governing System and its Impact on Environmental 
Policy Implementation, in CHINA ENVIRONMENT SERIES (1997) (discussing the challenges 
facing the Chinese government with relation to environmental awareness and its interactions 
with regulation and enforcement of environmental laws); Mushkat, Contextualizing 
Environmental Human Rights, supra note 158 (discussing the scale of global environmental 
governance, using China as its main example, and giving suggestions for how to effectively 
proceed into the future); Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158 
(outlining the history and current state of Chinese environmental law implementation). 
 200.  See infra notes 202–08 and accompanying text (discussing these three categories). 
 201.  See generally DOUGLASS CATER, POWER IN WASHINGTON:  A CRITICAL LOOK AT 
TODAY’S STRUGGLE IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL (1964) (outlining the structure of the United 
States government as it appeared in the mid-1960s); ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?  
DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1961) (analyzing the United States 
governmental system using a case study done in New Haven, Connecticut for specific 
examples); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS:  POLITICAL INTERESTS AND 
PUBLIC OPINION (1951) (giving an in-depth outline of the American governmental process, 
specifically how groups control the majority of aspects of this system). 
 202.  See generally DAHL, supra note 202 (outlining city-level government by looking at 
a case study in New Haven, Connecticut); TRUMAN, supra note 202 (analyzing the role of 
group politics in the American governmental system). 
 203.  See THOMAS R. DYE & L. HARMON ZIEGLER, THE IRONY OF DEMOCRACY:  AN 
UNCOMMON INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN POLITICS 1 (1981) ("Elites, not masses, govern 
America."). 
 204.  See generally id. (discussing the elitist model and how the elite class controls the 
political system of the United States). 
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pyramid, with power flowing from the top to the bottom.
205
  The sub-
governmental model departs marginally from this pattern by converting the 
rigid pyramid into an iron triangle consisting of political elites, their 
bureaucratic counterparts, special interests, and professional 
advisors/experts.
206
  The ruling coalition is normally stable and closed to 
outsiders, but more flexible formulations are available.
207
 
Elements of those three paradigms pervade the literature on environmental 
agenda setting and transformation, although the pure elitist construct is 
currently seldom resorted to by researchers who explore democratic 
processes (the overwhelming majority in this field).
208
 
 However, in light of the institutional atrophy and disarray witnessed in 
China, it may be more appropriate to adopt the garbage can model put forth 
by some organizational theorists.
209
  According to them, institutional 
choices are often made in a chaotic fashion in a milieu akin to organized 
anarchy.
210
  This renders policy adaptation an uncomfortably unfocused and 
                                                 
 205.  See generally id. (outlining, in detail, the American political system, with 
particular emphasis on control by a small group of elites, signaling a clear top-down 
structure). 
 206.  See generally CATER, supra note 202 (analyzing who controls the U.S. government 
in light of the massive expansion of the government that occurred from the beginning of the 
20th century through the years following World War II); J. LEIPER FREEMAN, THE POLITICAL 
PROCESS:  EXECUTIVE BUREAU-LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE RELATIONS (1965) (discussing the 
relationships within the U.S. government system, including between the three branches, the 
political parties, and individual agencies). 
 207.  See generally POLICY CHANGE AND LEARNING:  AN ADVOCACY COALITION 
APPROACH (Paul A. Sabatier & Hank C. Jenkins-Smith eds., 1993) (discussing "advocacy 
coalitions" in a variety of contexts, including an overall framework and a number of case 
studies in North America). 
 208.   See, e.g., FIORINO, supra note 55, at 22–59 (discussing the American model of 
ecological agenda setting, which involves mid-level sub-governmental agencies such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency that govern much of U.S. environmental policy); GOMAA, 
supra note 55, at 33–34 (concluding that Egypt’s environmental agenda is dictated by a 
small number of interested donor agencies, who by showing interest in contributing funds to 
the government, convinced the Prime Minister to address these issues); SCHREURS, supra 
note 55, at 241 (comparing Germany, whose approach to environmental protection "could be 
called the green social welfare state’s approach," with the U.S., where market-based 
mechanisms and cost-benefit analysis determine "when environmental protection should 
take precedence," and Japan, which falls somewhere in between the two); WEALE ET AL., 
supra note 55, at 115 (concluding that the European policy process is largely pluralist in 
nature, with a wide variety of sources lending input and support); WURZEL, supra note 55, at 
17–18 (characterizing German and British policy styles as favoring consensus and 
consultation, with German policy being slightly more rigid because it gives a more important 
role to the state than Britain does). 
 209 . See JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, AMBIGUITY AND CHOICE IN 
ORGANIZATIONS 24–37 (1976) (outlining the basics of the "garbage can" process of 
organizational theory, which exhibits persistent difficulties in resolving problems). 
 210.  Id. 




  There is reason to believe that Chinese decision 
making on the ecological front may display such characteristics.
212
 
 A strategically loose and poorly integrated structure offers ample 
scope for building autonomous power centers and, consequently, inter-party 
bargaining.
213
  That is consistent with institutionalist propositions which 
accord to negotiations a prominent role in complex organizational 
processes.
214
  Nevertheless, China may provide only partial reinforcement 
in this respect because evidence of cooperation/integrative bargaining is 
relatively modest, the implication being that institutionalist models of 
organizational negotiations may display an overly optimistic/positive 
orientation.
215
  Chinese-style environmental bargaining (or regime 
development) involves widespread diversion of resources, deflection of 
policy goals, dilemmas of administration (stemming from resistance to 




 Institutionalists duly acknowledge the importance of leadership in 
dynamic ecological management, but place strong emphasis on organized 
variants.
217
  The evolution of China’s amorphous and fractured 
environmental governance regime may be more influenced by individually-
inspired initiatives.
218
  For example, during the revolutionary era and early 
reform period a very small team of key players (the petroleum group) had 
virtually single-handedly shaped energy strategy in the country.
219
  Perhaps 
                                                 
 211.  Id. at 32–37; see also JOHN W. KINGDOM, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC 
POLICIES 84–89 (1984) (noting that the fluid structure of the garbage can model is akin to 
organized anarchy). 
 212.  See Mushkat, Contextualizing Environmental Human Rights, supra note 158, at 
162–175 (analyzing the reasons for Chinese bureaucratic incoherence on environmental 
affairs); Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 66–74 (highlighting 
poor observance of well-designed Chinese environmental laws).  
 213.  See MARCH & OLSEN, supra note 210, at 82–133 (describing the function of 
bargaining in decision-making among several models of choice). 
 214.  See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, at 81–116 (1994) 
(examining institutional bargaining in an international setting).  
 215.  See SINKULE & ORTOLANO, supra note 196, at 27–35, 188–202 (stating that 
negotiations and bargaining, which form the core of implementing Chinese environmental 
policy, are not collaborative and are often affected by interagency "games"). 
 216. See id. at 46–50, 188–202 (analyzing Chinese environmental and bureaucratic 
politics). 
 217.   See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note21, at 114–15, 152–60 
(finding that leadership is necessary in international negotiations but finding that 
effectiveness is determined by certain variables). 
 218.  See LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, POLICYMAKING IN CHINA, supra note 199, at 169–
268 (charting the elite hierarchy involved in decision-making). 
 219.  See LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS, supra note 198199, at 
151–248 (narrating China's initial involvement in petroleum production through the lens of 
the elites in the Chinese petroleum industry); LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, POLICYMAKING IN 
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more tellingly, one irrepressible individual (a policy entrepreneur?), Qu 
Geping—the first chief administrator of the National Environmental 
Protection Bureau (NEPB) – had been at the forefront of systematic efforts 




 Traditional-style utilitarianism is thought to be inapplicable by 
institutionalists in intricate and diffuse organizational settings.
221
  This 
narrowly-focused form of analytical reasoning however should not be 
readily discarded.  The Chinese environmental arena is crowded with 
players (determined utility-maximizers) who vigorously pursue their own 
interests to the detriment of the common good.
222
  This manifests itself 
throughout the politico-bureaucratic pyramid, but particularly at the sub-
national level, where the prevailing incentive structure encourages the 
formation of coalitions of local government officials and entrepreneurs 
capable of stymieing progress in the ecological domain.
223
 
B. Looking Outward 
 
 China’s participation in the development of international 
environmental governance regimes has been explored selectively rather 
than comprehensively.  Moreover, Chinese involvement in some cases has 
been marginal, in the sense of being confined to joining an existing 
arrangement, as distinct from tangibly contributing to the design/redesign 
and attempts to forge a broad consensus.
 
  It is nevertheless possible to 
derive a number of useful insights on the basis of this limited and partly 
relevant information/experience because it is not insignificant and due to 
the fact that certain recurrent patterns may be observed. 
 One source of pertinent information is a series of events relating to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC 
                                                                                                                 
CHINA, supra note 199, at 169–268 (charting the rise in influence of Chinese petroleum 
policy makers from the 1950s to 1980s). 
 220.  See ECONOMY, supra note 153, at 100–01 (recounting Qu Geping's efforts on the 
environmental protection front). 
 221.  See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, at 114–15 (pointing out 
the deficiencies of the utilitarian perspective). 
 222.  See Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 87–91 
(observing the competition between governmental players in Chinese environmental 
regulation). 
 223.  See Kenneth G. Lieberthal, China’s Governing System and its Impact on the 
Environment 1 CHINA ENVTL. SERIES 3, 3–6 (1997) (detailing the incentive structure that 
leads to collaboration between local government officials and entrepreneurs in suppressing 
observance of environmental regulations); Mushkat, Contextualizing Environmental Human 
Rights, supra note 158, at 161–65 (observing the deficiencies in administrative enforcement 
of Chinese environmental regulation due to the vast array of interested government parties); 
Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 72–74, 81–85 (observing the 
disconnect between Chinese environmental policy and enforcement).   




 one of numerous international environmental accords to have been 
negotiated since the 1972 Conference on the Human Environment held in 
Stockholm.
225
  The text of the Convention was the culmination of 
bargaining extending over a fifteen-month period and orchestrated by the 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC), convened by the United 
Nations General Assembly and open to participation by all interested 
States.
226
  The Convention was made available for signature at the UN 
Convention on Environment and Development (UNCED) in June 1992 at 
Rio de Janeiro, and adopted by over 150 States.
227
 
 It should be noted that, despite enjoying broad international support, 
the FCCC did not elicit a binding commitment on the part of the 
signatories, who merely signaled their intention to ratify the agreement in 
accordance with their internal constitutional processes.
228
 Moreover, even 
then, the treaty would not come into force as law until ratified by the 
minimum number of States specified in the text (fifty).
229
  The Rio 
Conference however took symbolic steps and established concrete 




 The term effective needs to be employed cautiously in this context.  
"Traditionally, a treaty in international law establishes rights and 
obligations among States and is designed to govern State behavior," while 
"most environmental agreements, although cast in the language of State 
obligation, are designed ultimately to change the behavior of private 
                                                 
 224.  See generally United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 
9th, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC] (committing countries to negotiate 
reductions in emissions that cause climate change). 
 225.  See generally U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1 (1973) (setting out principles that must be considered in order to 
preserve the environment while promoting development). 
 226.  See Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, The Climate Change Negotiations, in 
NEGOTIATING CLIMATE CHANGE:  THE INSIDE STORY OF THE RIO CONVENTION, 129, 129–31 
(Irving M. Mintzer & J.A. Leonard eds., 1994) (recounting briefly the negotiating history of 
the Rio Convention). 
 227.  As of August 26, 2009, there are 193 parties to the Convention.  See UNFCCC, 
supra note 225, available at http:unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/ 
status_of_ratification/items/2631.php (listing the roster of nations that are parties to the 
convention); see also Dasgupta, supra note 226, at 131–46 (reviewing the negotiations 
process in an insightful manner). 
 228.  See UNFCCC, supra note 225, at art. 22, available at 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php 
(binding the parties to the convention). 
 229.  See id. art. 23 (stating that the FCCC came into force on March 21, 1994); see 
also UNFCCC, supra note 225, available at http://unfccc.int/ (providing background 
information). 
 230.  See Dasgupta, supra note 227, at 129–46 (reviewing the specific obligations 
created by the Convention). 





  Therefore, "the State must enact domestic legislation and 
establish administrative machinery to ensure this outcome."
232
  Still, even if 
the State proceeds to pursue that goal "in good faith, there is no assurance 
that the ultimate objective—the reduction of emissions by private 
individuals and firms will actually take place."
233
 
 International environmental treaties such as the FCCC also tend to be 
elastic and open-ended.  To be more explicit, they typically assume the 
form of "a framework or umbrella convention, providing general 
cooperation in the area" where behavioral adjustment is deemed 
necessary.
234
 Such umbrella conventions anticipate "subsequent, more 
specific supplementary accords (frequently called protocols) that will 
establish more concrete obligations."
235
  Compliance may thus be a thorny 
issue when these kinds of institutional patterns prevail.  Further, 
deciphering State movements may be a challenging undertaking.
236
 
                                                 
 231.  See Abram Chayes & Charlotte Kim, China and the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, in ENERGIZING CHINA:  RECONCILING ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 503, 506 (Michael B. McElroy et al. eds., 1998) 
(examining the general contours of treaty obligations);  Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler 
Chayes, & Ronald B. Mitchell, Managing Compliance:  A Comparative Perspective, in 
ENGAGING COUNTRIES:  STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 39, 42–43 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 
1998) (describing international norms as the foundation for compliance). 
 232.  See Chayes & Kim, supra note 232, at 506 (describing the obligations placed on 
countries by international treaties).  See generally David Vogel & Timothy Kessler, How 
Compliance Happens and Doesn’t Happen Domestically, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES:  
STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 19, 20–23 
(Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998) (noting how administrative capacity 
can limit effectiveness of international obligations). 
 233.  See Chayes & Kim, supra note 232, at 506 (noting that compliance is not identical 
to any responsibilities assumed).  See generally ENGAGING COUNTRIES:  STRENGTHENING 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss & 
Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998) (examining ways to make decision-making more effective in 
regulating the global environment); IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (James Cameron, Jacob Werksman, & Peter Roderick eds., 1996) 
(examining possible solutions to increase compliance with international agreements without 
breaking fragile political consensus); Michael Faure & Jurgen Lefevere, Compliance with 
International Environmental Agreements, in THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT:  INSTITUTIONS, 
LAW, AND POLICY 138, 138–56 (Norman J. Vig & Regina S. Axelrod eds., 1999) (discussing 
the theories of compliance and methods for improving compliance for international accords). 
 234.  See Chayes & Kim, supra note 232, at 506 (outlining the nature of international 
environmental commitments). 
 235.  See id. (discussing the nature of protocols made subsequent to international 
conventions); see also Dan Bodansky, UN Convention on Climate Change, 18 YALE J.  INT’L 
L. 451, 493–96 (1993) (outlining the characteristics of framework conventions). 
 236.  See Jana von Stein, The International Law and Politics of Climate Change:  
Ratification of the UN Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, 52 J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 243, 243–68 (2008) (arguing that while "soft" agreements like the FCCC achieve 
widespread participation fairly quickly, leaders who ratify do not appear to be particularly 
concerned about their ability subsequently to comply with such agreements).  For a 
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 China approached the FCCC challenge seriously, constructively, and 
actively.
237
  It took a close interest and participated willingly in the 
elaborate scientific studies conducted from 1988 to late 1990 under the 
auspices of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
238
 The 
IPCC is "a broadly-based body of scientific experts designated by 
governments" who will "study the science of climate change, the likely 
impacts, and potential response strategies."
239
  In addition, Chinese 
representatives were deeply involved from late 1990 to the signing of the 
Convention in June 1992 in INC efforts to negotiate the FCCC.
240
  For the 
most part, they exercised leadership and played a supportive role.
241
 
 It was not however an entirely positive experience from an 
international perspective.  While apparently not engaged in deliberate foot-
dragging, China was at times distinctly slow to engineer new protocols 
during the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC-XI) meeting 
leading up to the first Conference of Parties after the FCCC was negotiated 
(resorting to vivid expressions to justify its posture:  ‘the Convention is like 
a big pie, and if you try to swallow the whole pie in one gulp, you will 
choke’, ‘more haste, less speed’, and ‘first steps first’).
242
  It also 
strenuously objected, whether strategically or tactically, to some key 
elements of the FCCC blueprint (e.g., in-depths reviews, mechanics of the 
review process, country visits, joint implementation, targets, timetables, 
imposition of obligations on industrializing countries to reduce emissions, 




 Moreover, Chinese representatives consistently voiced skepticism 
regarding the validity of the IPCC’s views on the subject of climate change 
("[m]any scientists cast doubts on the causes of climate change.  There are 
so many factors affecting climate change, including the activities of the 
sunspots, regulatory role of the oceans, the gigantic role of the Earth’s 
                                                                                                                 
discussion of the merits/demerits of the framework convention/protocol approach, see 
Bodansky, supra note 236, at 451, 493–95. 
 237.  See Dasgupta, supra note 227, at 138–39 (recounting the China’s involvement in 
the Rio Convention). 
 238.  See Baozhong Wu et al., The Status and Trend of China’s Policies on Climate 
Change, in ENERGIZING CHINA:  RECONCILING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 541, 543 (Michael B. McElroy et al. eds., 1998) (recalling China's involvement in 
negotiating alongside the Group of 77). 
 239.  See Chayes & Kim, supra note 232, at 507 (describing the workings of the IPCC). 
 240.  Id. at 513–15. 
 241.  See id. at 507 (recalling China's negotiating role in FCCC negotiations).  See also 
Baozhong Wu, supra note 239, at 541–54 (examining China's role in representing 
developing nations alongside the Group of 77). 
 242.  See Chayes & Kim, supra note 232, at 523 (recalling China's efforts to slow the 
pace of negotiations). 
 243.  Id. at 515–23. 
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biosphere, water vapor and clouds, etc.").
244
  The Chinese delegation also 
repeatedly emphasized that, given the residual gaps in technical knowledge, 
it would be inappropriate to proceed firmly and swiftly ("governments 
could not base policies decisions on such scientific uncertainties").
245
 
 The leadership exercised by China did not necessarily manifest itself 
in a comprehensive fashion.  It often approached crucial issues in a manner 
that might be construed as partisan, in the sense of not reflecting worldwide 
considerations.
246
  It is a moot point whether it was driven by its own 
parochial interests or the belief (legitimate or otherwise) that the 
international community is too heterogeneous and too unevenly structured 
to allow its members to adopt a uniform strategy with respect to 
environmental protection.
247
  Chinese representatives underlined the 
persistence of substantial economic inequalities and vigorously championed 
the cause of industrializing nations, perhaps implicitly relegating ecological 
preservation to a position of secondary importance: 
The FCCC currently negotiated should clearly recognize that it is 
the developed countries which are mainly responsible for excessive 
emissions of greenhouse gases, historically and currently, and it is 
these developed countries which must take immediate action, with 
time-bound targets, to stabilize and reduce such emissions.  
Developing countries cannot be expected to accept any obligations 
in the near future . . . .  [D]eveloping countries must be provided 
with the full scientific, technical, and financial cooperation 




Neoliberal institutionalist insights may not fully account for this pattern.  
As noted earlier, the Chinese organizational façade is rather rudimentary 
and seriously fragmented.
249
  This may explain the markedly slow policy 
adaptation and frequent shifts (again, whether strategic or tactical) in the 
stance regarding fundamental ecological questions.
250
  To reiterate a point 
made previously, neoliberal institutionalists acknowledge the role played by 
                                                 
 244.  Id. at 524. 
 245.  Id.  
 246. See id. at 515–23 (recounting China’s repeated demands to hold developing 
countries to a different standard from developed countries). 
 247.  See id. at 515–27 (observing China's assertion that developing countries' economic 
situations entitle them to environmental regimes different from those in developed 
countries).  
 248.  See id. at 515 (recounting China's efforts separate developing countries from 
developed countries in terms of duties under the FCCC). 
 249.   See Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 87–91 
(observing the discord in the Chinese environmental regime). 
 250.  See Chayes & Kim, supra note 232, at 515–23 (examining China's reluctance to 
rapidly implement FCCC protocols). 
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domestic diversity in shaping behavior in the international (including 
environmental) arena, but they arguably overstate the intensity of forces 
inducing actors to cooperate/engage in integrative bargaining and 
understate the strength of divisive influences.
251
 
 Once more, the utilitarian perspective may be selectively invoked.
252
  
It has been claimed that China’s complex maneuvers in such multilateral 
settings closely mirror self-interest, even when the tone is altruistic, and 
that they are grounded in a set of principles derived from robust cost-benefit 
logic (‘[m]aximize material capabilities above all’; ‘[a]void high cost 
commitments’; ‘[i]f avoidance incurs image costs, then try to avoid high 
cost commitments but join low cost, high profile activities’; ‘[i]f the 
opportunities to pursue material gains unilaterally are closed off, and [the 
country] has little choice but to join multilateral negotiations, then it should 
try to build coalitions to weaken commitments’; ‘[i]f unilateral 
opportunities to maximize relative capabilities are closed off, and coalition 
building unsuccessful, then [it] should choose the least constraining 




 Chinese advocacy of industrializing nation causes may not be 
exclusively motivated by utilitarian concerns.  China may genuinely see 
itself, or at least did in the past, as a leader of a counter-hegemonic coalition 
that is pursuing a redistributive agenda (the eradication of inequalities and 
global justice primarily, and ecosystem harmony and sustainability 
secondarily).  To the extent that this assumption has any validity, it cannot 
be readily accommodated within the framework of mainstream (utilitarian, 
realist, cognitivist, and neoliberal institutionalist) international 
                                                 
 251.  See O’NEILL, THE ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 60, 
at 32 (discussing the organizational necessity of institution-building in international 
regimes); YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 12, at 11–30 (examining the 
theoretical workings of international regimes from an institutional perspective).  
 252.  See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, at 91–95 (outlining the 
utilitarian perspective generally). 
 253.  See Alastair I. Johnson, China and International Environmental Institutions:  A 
Decision Analysis Rule in ENERGIZING CHINA:  RECONCILING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 555, 565–82 (Michael B. McElroy et al. eds., 1998) (comparing 
China’s arms control policy with its environmental policy); see also Roger Congleton, 
Governing the Global Environmental Commons:  The Political Economy of International 
Environmental Treaties and Institutions, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS:  A 
SURVEY OF THE ISSUES 241, 241–63 (Gunther G. Shulz & Heinrich W. Ursprung eds., 2001) 
(examining the externality problem in international environmental problems); Carsten 
Schmidt, Incentives for International Environmental Cooperation:  Theoretical Models and 
Economic Instruments, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS:  A SURVEY OF THE 
ISSUES 209, 209–40 (Gunther G. Shulz & Heinrich W. Ursprung eds., 2001) (examining 
theoretical frameworks for incentivizing compliance with international agreements and 
finding that underlying assumptions are not consonant with certain realities of international 
relations).  
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environmental theory.  To dissect such behavioral patterns, the tools of 
political economy (the neo-Marxist, historical, materialist, and neo-
Gramscian variants) may need to be employed.
254
 
 Another Chinese experience, which may be relied upon to generate 
insights regarding the development of environmental governance regimes, 
involves the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
(hereafter referred to as the Montreal Protocol or simply the Protocol).
255
  It 
is an instrument whose origins may be traced to the Vienna Convention for 
the Protection of the Ozone Layer, a framework convention ratified by 
twenty-one countries in 1985 (and ultimately, like the FCCC, to the 1972 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, 




 The ozone layer, which consists of the reaches of earth’s atmosphere 
between ten and fifty kilometers above the ground, furnishes protection to 
myriad organisms from the harmful effects of ultra-violet radiation from the 
sun.
257
  Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), halons, and a wide range of industrial 
chemicals, commonly referred to as ozone-depleting substances (ODS), 
materially diminish its protective capacities.
258
  In 1987, the Montreal 
Protocol, which provides specific requirements and deadlines for countries 
to reduce production and use of CFCs, was adopted.
259
  A key provision of 
the Protocol requires signatory developing countries to phase out 
production and use of CFCs and halons by 2010.
260
 
                                                 
 254.  See O’NEILL, supra note 60, at 7–20 (discussing the interplay of international 
environmental agreements and international environmental politics); Paterson, supra note 
60, at 55–59 (outlining the various theories of international politics). 
 255.   Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, September 16, 
1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 256.  For a detailed account of the Montreal Protocol’s negotiations, see RICHARD 
ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY:  NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET 
(2nd ed., 1998), which examines the Montreal Protocol negotiations from an insider's 
perspective.  For an effective historical overview and update through 1992, see Ian H. 
Rowlands, The Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol:  Report and 
Reflection, 35 ENV’T 25, 25–34 (1993), which reviews chronologically the important events 
in the negotiations of the Montreal Protocol. 
 257.  See BENEDICK, supra note 257, at 9 (discussing the science of the ozone layer). 
 258.  Id. at 10. 
 259.  Id. at 1. 
 260.  For a comprehensive account of the control measures and respective obligations 
under the Protocol, see Ozone Secretariat, Handbook for the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 1, 15–18 (United Nations Environment Program, 
8th ed. 2009) available at http://ozone.unep.org/Publications/MP_Handbook/ (reviewing the 
Montreal Protocol's history and purpose).  
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 The Protocol was bolstered in 1990 when the London Amendments 
established an interim Multilateral Fund (MLF or the Fund).
261
  The Fund, 
which acquired a permanent status (and London base) in 1992, was created 
to assist signatory developing countries with an annual consumption of 
ODS lower than 0.3 Kg per capita (‘Article 5 countries’) in meeting their 
obligations under the Protocol.
262
  The London Amendments, which 
significantly expanded the scope of the 1987 Protocol, were signed by a 
majority of developing countries (subsequent revisions have had fewer 
implications for industrializing nations).
263
 
 China ratified the Montreal Protocol in 1991, after the establishment 
of the MLF.
264
  This move coincided with calls on its part for financial 
support to facilitate the discharge of its obligations so that there evidently 
was a clear linkage between the willingness to commit and the availability 
of assistance.
265
  Following ratification, the Chinese authorities promptly 
took the necessary steps to meet procedural requirements by setting up 
institutions to effect protocol implementation, devising a country program 
for the phase-out of ODS, and reporting ODS production and consumption 
data to the Ozone Secretariat.
266
 
 The actual performance has not consistently reflected the strength of 
the procedural commitment.  China encountered considerable difficulties in 
complying with the substantive goals during the initial period after 
ratification and intensified its efforts since 1996.
267
  Following this 
adjustment, results have improved relative to targets, but the overall picture 
has remained problematic.
268
  Chinese share of the world’s total production 
                                                 
 261.  See BENEDICK, supra note 257, at 183–88 (recalling the benefits afforded by the 
fund). 
 262.  About the Multilateral Fund, MULTILATERAL FUND FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL (2003), available at 
http://www.multilateralfund.org/about_the_multilateral_fund.htm. 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  Jimin Zhao & Leonard Ortolano, The Chinese Government’s Role in Implementing 
Multilateral Agreements:  The Case of the Montreal Protocol, 175 CHINA Q.  708, 709–10 
(2003). 
 265.  See id. at 714–15 (recalling China's demands for instituting the fund to help 
developing countries enforce the protocol). 
 266.  See Zhao & Ortolano, supra note 264, at 708–25 (2003) (narrating China's efforts 
to implement the protocol); Jimin Zhao, Implementing International Environmental Treaties 
in Developing Countries:  China’s Compliance under the Montreal Protocol, 5 GLOBAL 
ENV’L POL. 58, 58–81 (2005) [hereinafter Zhao, Implementing International Environmental 
Treaties] (measuring China's compliance with the Montreal protocol); Jimin Zhao, The 
Multilateral Fund and China’s Compliance with the Montreal Protocol, 11 J. ENV. & DEV. 
331, 331–53 (2002) [hereinafter Zhao, The Multilateral Fund] (narrating China's efforts to 
implement the protocol). 
 267.  See Zhao, Implementing International Environmental Treaties, supra note 267, at 
62 (recalling China's failure to meet its goal to reduce ozone-depleting emissions by 1996). 
 268.  See id. at 64–66 (detailing China's success at reducing ozone-depleting emissions). 
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and consumption has climbed markedly because of a significant increase in 
domestic demand and a corresponding decline in production and 
consumption by industrialized nations, previously the principal source of 
ODS.
269
 The ratification of the Montreal Protocol was not a straightforward 
proposition for a country in the early stages of modernization.  The costs 
expected to be incurred by some economic sectors were not negligible, and 
powerful arguments against the move were advanced by representatives of 
those sectors and government officials overseeing them.
270
  The debate 
raged over a long period and the decision could have gone either way.
271
  
China’s scientific community (idea-driven and loosely integrated into an 
international network) played a pivotal role in tipping the balance in favor 
of ratification.
272
  This is a cognitivist-style interpretation, albeit not without 
institutionalist underpinnings. 
 The utilitarian model however is probably the most appropriate 
analytical tool for dissecting China’s response to the dilemma posed by the 
Montreal Protocol.  While the burden to be borne by a number of key 
economic sectors could not be ignored, the costs for the country as a whole 
were deemed to be relatively modest.
273
  There were gains to be realized, in 
the form of a better image abroad and concessions secured in other areas, 
by displaying a cooperative attitude.
274
  Ultimately, the availability of 




 Institutional influences were by no means absent. They manifested 
themselves visibly during the pre-negotiation, negotiation, and post-
negotiation phases of the process.  To illustrate, implementation was 
substantially impacted by a host of organizational constraints (e.g., limited 
administrative capacity, excessive centralization, ineffective regulatory 
strategies, and inadequate enforcement).
276
  Be that as it may, institutional 
                                                 
 269.  Zhao, The Multilateral Fund, supra note 267, at 710 (stating that China has 
become the largest producer and consumer of ozone-depleting substances). 
 270.  See Zhao & Ortolano, supra note 265, at 711–12 (narrating the debate within the 
Chinese government). 
 271.  Id.  
 272.  See Zhao & Ortolano, supra note 264, at 708, 711 (stating that the scientific 
community played an outsized role in persuading the government to limit emissions); Zhao, 
Implementing International Environmental Treaties, supra note 266, at 58, 71 (noting the 
strength of the scientific evidence); Zhao, The Multilateral Fund, supra note 267, at 331–53 
(detailing efforts by the scientific community to persuade the government).  
 273.  See Zhao, Implementing International Environmental Treaties, supra note 267, at 
73 (stating that low compliance costs were one of the reasons China accepted the protocol). 
 274.  See Zhao & Ortolano, supra note 267, at 715–16 (observing that a cooperative 
image of China was a motivating factor in China's acceptance of the protocol). 
 275.  See id. (focusing on the fund as a key reason for China's acceptance of the 
protocol). 
 276.  See Elizabeth C. Economy, The Impact of International Regimes on Chinese 
Foreign Policy-Making:  Broadening Perspectives and Policies . . . But Only to a Point, in 
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patterns alone cannot account fully for the outcomes witnessed.  Other 
theoretical perspectives need to be systematically incorporated into the 




 Environmental governance regimes have featured prominently in 
domestic and international efforts to curtail ecological degradation.  The 
academic literature on the subject is broad, deep, and insightful.  As might 
be expected, given the socio-physical complexities confronted and the 
nature of the scholarly enterprise, it is characterized by a high degree of 
analytical diversity and intellectual tension.  Attempts at genuine 
integration/ synthesis have been far and few between.  Competing 
paradigms have largely drifted their own separate ways, experiencing little 
cross-fertilization. 
 In the Darwinian world of academic ideas, some perspectives fare 
better than others.  Realism has been found to have merely marginal 
relevance as a theoretical tool for shedding light on the development of 
environmental governance regimes. Utilitarianism and cognitivism have 
exerted greater influence but have lost some of their original luster.  
Neoliberal institutionalism, on the other hand, has gained momentum and 
its proponents have been the dominant force shaping the understanding of 
the dynamics of ecological management system formation and 
transformation. 
 Neoliberal institutionalism is firmly rooted in Western democratic soil, 
although its claims of universal validity are not unjustified.  It has not really 
been extensively and properly tested in inherently less hospitable territory.  
Many Chinese environmental experiences may be comfortably 
accommodated within a neoliberal institutional framework.
277
  As 
                                                                                                                 
THE MAKING OF CHINESE FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN AN ERA OF REFORM 230, 241–49 
(David M. Lampton ed., 2001) (documenting the reticence within the Chinese government 
over adopting and adhering to the Montreal Protocol); Zhang Kunmin & Wang Can, China’s 
Sustainable Development Strategy and International Cooperation on the Environment, in 
IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN GERMANY AND CHINA 1, 1–19 
(Zhenghua Tao and Rudiger Wolfrum eds., 2001) (detailing China's solutions to the 
environmental problems it faces); Mushkat, Contextualizing Environmental Human Rights, 
supra note 158, at 162–175 (discussing the factors that hinder Chinese ecological 
governance); Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Law, supra note 158, at 66–74 
(detailing the factors weighing down Chinese environmental regulatory enforcement).  
 277.  See generally GERALD CHAN, CHINA’S COMPLIANCE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS:  TRADE, 
ARMS CONTROL, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, HUMAN RIGHTS (2006) (measuring China's 
international involvement by its compliance with international accords); HEGGELUND, supra 
note 90 (examining Chinese efforts to build the Three Gorges Dam through an 
environmental lens); ANN KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE:  CHINA, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND GLOBAL SECURITY 144–80 (2007); Gerald Chan, China’s Compliance 
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demonstrated in this paper, there is however ample evidence to suggest that 
the challenges of explaining regime development is simply too 
overwhelming to be addressed from a single conceptual viewpoint.  It may 
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Environmental Regimes, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT 129, 129–48 (Aril Underdal ed., 1998) (theorizing that international solutions 
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